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Article 
Wrongful-Aspect Overdetermination:  The Scope-of-
the-Risk Requirement in Drunk-Driving Homicide 
ERIC A. JOHNSON 
Tort law’s scope-of-the-risk rule says that a defendant is liable for 
another person’s injury only if the injury resulted from the very risks that 
made the defendant’s conduct wrongful.  Criminal law scholars have 
neglected the question whether the scope-of-the-risk rule (or its wrongful-
aspect variant) also applies in criminal cases.  But the question has 
divided the courts.  In drunk-driving homicide cases, many courts have 
said that the government must prove a causal nexus between the 
defendant’s intoxication—the wrongful-aspect of his conduct—and the 
fatal accident.  Many others, though, have said the opposite.  In this 
Article, I will argue that courts on both sides of this seeming divide have 
recognized intuitively: (1) that the scope-of-the-risk rule does apply to 
drunk-driving homicide cases; but (2) that what is required by way of a 
causal nexus between the defendant’s intoxication and the fatal accident is 
something less than but-for causation.  What is required, specifically, is 
that the intoxication contribute incrementally to the causal mechanism 
behind the fatal accident.  In effect, the courts have recognized intuitively 
that most drunk-driving homicide cases are causal-overdetermination 
cases. 
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Wrongful-Aspect Overdetermination:  The Scope-of-
the-Risk Requirement in Drunk-Driving Homicide 
ERIC A. JOHNSON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On the evening of January 12, 2008, Jose Rincon and Oscar Perez, 
both fourteen years old, were riding their bicycles in a bike lane on 
Broadway Boulevard in Tucson when a car struck Rincon from behind, 
killing him.1  The car’s driver, Glenda Rumsey, stopped her car after 
driving another 1600 feet.2  Then she walked back to the crash scene, 
where she was arrested.3  Subsequent tests showed that Rumsey’s blood-
alcohol level was 0.25%, more than three times the legal limit.4  The state 
charged Rumsey with reckless manslaughter.5  At her trial on this charge, 
Rumsey challenged the state’s evidence of causation.6  In particular, she 
claimed that Rincon’s death was attributable not to her intoxication, but to 
the defective design of the intersection where the accident occurred.7  She 
argued, in substance, that even a driver who was not intoxicated might 
have struck Rincon.8 
In criminal cases, courts usually conceive of the causation requirement 
as having two components: (1) a requirement of “but-for” causation; and 
(2) a requirement of causal “proximity.”9  But Rumsey’s causation 
defense—her claim that even a sober driver might have struck Rincon—
                                                                                                                          
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. 
1 State v. Rumsey, No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0041, 2010 WL 3410824, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 
2010); A.J. Flick, Drunk Driver to Spend 14 Years in Prison, TUCSON CITIZEN, Jan. 21, 2009, at A10. 
2 Appellee’s Answering Brief at 1, Rumsey, 2010 WL 3410824 (No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0041). 
3 Id.  
4 Flick, supra note 1. 
5 Rumsey, 2010 WL 3410824, at *1. 
6 Id. at *8. 
7 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 4–5, Rumsey, 2010 WL 3410824 (No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0041). 
8 See id. at 13 (“Here the expert testimony indicated that there would have been no accident if the 
road had been designed differently, whether Glenda was intoxicated or not. Thus, . . . Glenda’s 
intoxication would not have been the cause of Jose’s death and Oscar’s injury if the road had been built 
correctly because witnesses testified that her driving was normal.”).  
9 See People v. Schaefer, 703 N.W.2d 774, 785 (Mich. 2005) (“In criminal jurisprudence, the 
causation element of an offense is generally comprised of two components: factual cause and 
proximate cause. . . . [Proximate causation] is a legal construct designed to prevent criminal liability 
from attaching when the result of the defendant’s conduct is viewed as too remote or too unnatural.”); 
see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 14.02[A] (6th ed. 2012) (“Causation 
analysis is divisible into two parts: ‘actual cause’ . . . and ‘proximate cause’ . . . .”).  
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was not addressed to either of these two standard components of criminal 
law causation. 
First, Rumsey’s defense casts no doubt on the existence of a but-for 
causal relationship between her conduct and the victim’s death.  The but-
for test requires the fact finder to subtract counterfactually the “conduct” 
that is the basis for the criminal charge—in Rumsey’s case, her driving10—
and then to decide whether the victim’s injury still would have occurred in 
this counterfactual universe.11  In Rumsey’s case, it was obvious that if she 
had not gotten behind the wheel on the night of the accident, she would not 
have struck Rincon.  And so, as Rumsey’s attorney appears to have 
conceded, Rumsey’s conduct was a but-for cause of the accident.12  
Rumsey’s defense was not addressed to the but-for requirement, then. 
Neither, though, was Rumsey’s defense addressed to the questions of 
causal proximity and intervention.  Rumsey’s was not a case where the 
causal sequence connecting the actor’s conduct to the result was long or 
tenuous.13  Nor did her case involve any “intervening cause.”  Intervening 
causes, by definition, intervene temporally between the actor’s conduct and 
the result.14  Thus, “events that predate the defendant’s action and states 
that are in existence at the time of the defendant’s acts [cannot be] 
intervening causes.”15  The alleged defects in the design of the intersection 
                                                                                                                          
10 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(5), (9) (1985) (defining “conduct” as “an action or omission” 
and distinguishing “conduct” elements from “attendant circumstance” elements); see also State v. 
Wheeler, 219 P.3d 1170, 1178 (Haw. 2009) (“[I]n order to commit the offense of [operating a vehicle 
under the influence of an intoxicant], a person must either drive or assume actual physical control of a 
vehicle. . . . Under the analytical framework established by the Model Penal Code, this is the conduct 
element of the offense.”); Kelly v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1148, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]he crime 
[of] operating a vehicle while intoxicated . . . consists of the prohibited conduct, operating a vehicle, 
and the presence of an attendant circumstance, intoxication.”). 
11 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1) & explanatory note. 
12 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 7, at 13 (“[T]he jury was free to apply this instruction to 
the [manslaughter charge] and conclude that but for the fact that Glenda drove in the bicycle lane the 
death of Jose and injury of Oscar would not have occurred.”). 
13 See Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1425, 1467–68 (2003) (identifying the traditional requirement of causal proximity as something 
distinct both from the requirement of but-for causation and from the scope-of-the-risk limitation). 
14 MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND 
METAPHYSICS 234 (2009) (“Intervening causes must intervene between the defendant’s act and the 
harm . . . .”); see also Rossell v. Volkswagen of Am., 709 P.2d 517, 525 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (“[An 
intervening event] is one which intervenes between [a] defendant’s negligent act and the final result 
and is a necessary component in bringing about that result.”); State v. Holthaus, No. C2-99-1793, 2000 
WL 821607, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 27, 2000) (holding that the victim’s ATV operation did not 
qualify as an intervening cause in Holthaus’ drunk-driving homicide prosecution, because the victim’s 
conduct “cannot be characterized as occurring after Holthaus’ conduct or between Holthaus’ conduct 
and the collision”). 
15 MOORE, supra note 14, at 234; see also Zelman v. Stauder, 466 P.2d 766, 769 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1970) (“[If the] negligent course of conduct (as distinguished from the risk of harm created) actively 
continues up to the time the injury is sustained, then any outside force which is also a substantial factor 
in bringing about the injury is a concurrent cause of the injury and never an ‘intervening’ force.”). 
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where Rumsey ran over Rincon were “states in existence” at the time of 
the accident, not intervening events. 
Rumsey’s defense instead was addressed to a third component of 
causation, which I will call the scope-of-the-risk limitation.  Though rarely 
mentioned by criminal law scholars, the scope-of-the-risk limitation is an 
established part of what tort law requires by way of causation.  The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, for example, requires a plaintiff in a tort case 
to show that his harm “result[ed] from the risks that made the actor’s 
conduct tortious.”16  A criminal law counterpart of this Restatement 
provision—requiring the government to show that the victim’s harm 
represented the coming-to-fruition of the risks that made the actor’s 
conduct wrongful—is exactly what Rumsey’s defense presupposed.  What 
made Rumsey’s drunk driving wrongful, of course, was Rumsey’s 
intoxication—and more particularly the risks associated with intoxication’s 
effects on her judgment, motor function, and perception.  If, as Rumsey 
claimed, even a sober driver might have struck Rincon under the 
circumstances, then Rincon’s death could not be said (or, more precisely, 
could not be said beyond a reasonable doubt) to have resulted from the 
risks that made Rumsey’s conduct wrongful. 
The viability of Rumsey’s defense appears to depend, then, on whether 
the scope-of-the-risk limitation applies to criminal cases.  As it happens, 
the courts are split roughly equally on this question.  In cases like 
Rumsey’s, some courts have said that the government is required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt not just that the defendant’s driving was a cause 
of the victim’s death but, in addition, that “that the intoxication was a 
cause of the victim’s death.”17  Other courts, though, have said explicitly 
                                                                                                                          
16 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 
(2010). 
17 Lupro v. State, 603 P.2d 468, 475 (Alaska 1979); see also State v. Robinett, No. 28564, 2004 
WL 32949, at *2 (Idaho Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2004) (interpreting an “aggravated DUI” statute to require that 
a defendant’s intoxication be a cause of the victim’s injuries), aff’d, 106 P.3d 436 (Idaho 2005); State v. 
Price, 952 So. 2d 112, 117 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that “[u]nder the vehicular homicide statute, 
‘the state . . . must prove that an offender’s unlawful blood alcohol concentration combined with his 
operation of a vehicle to cause the death of a human being’” and noting that “[i]t is insufficient for the 
State to prove merely that the alcohol consumption ‘coincides’ with the accident” (second alteration in 
original) (quoting State v. Taylor, 463 So. 2d 1274, 1275 (La. 1985))); Webber v. State, 577 A.2d 58, 
63 (Md. 1990) (holding that under a statute defining the offense of “homicide by motor vehicle while 
intoxicated” it “was incumbent upon the State to prove, not merely that appellant was intoxicated when 
he drove the automobile that struck and killed the victim, but also that his negligence [i.e., his 
intoxication or some other form of negligence] caused the victim’s death”); State v. Sommers, 272 
N.W.2d 367, 371 (Neb. 1978) (interpreting a “motor vehicle homicide” statute to require proof that 
“the alcohol level in defendant’s body was an important link in the cause of decedent’s death”); People 
v. Baker, 826 N.Y.S.2d 550, 553 (Essex County Ct. 2006) (holding that a vehicular manslaughter 
statute “requires a defendant’s intoxication to be causally connected to the cause of death”); 
Commonwealth v. Molinaro, 631 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (requiring the government to 
prove, as an element of “homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence” of alcohol, that a 
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that the government is not required to prove “a causal connection between 
intoxication and death.”18  Decisions like these appear, at first glance 
anyway, to mark a stark divide between two clearly defined and utterly 
opposed positions.  Neither of these positions would seem particularly 
difficult to defend, moreover.  Even in tort law, scholars have reached very 
different conclusions about the advisability of the scope-of-the-risk 
limitation.  Many, and probably most, tort scholars agree that this 
limitation on tort liability is required—“that accidental tortfeasors should 
not be held liable for harm that is outside the scope of the risk that made 
the act tortious.”19  But some widely respected tort scholars have argued 
that this scope-of-the-risk limitation is inadvisable or even incoherent.20  It 
                                                                                                                          
defendant’s “intoxication was a direct and substantial cause of the accident”); Hale v. State, 194 
S.W.3d 39, 42 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that to support a conviction for intoxication manslaughter, 
the State must prove that a driver’s “intoxication, not just his operation of a vehicle, caused the fatal 
result”); Wyatt v. State, 624 S.E.2d 118, 121 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a conviction for 
involuntary intoxication based on drunk driving requires proof “that a causal connection exists between 
the driver’s intoxication and the death of another person”); State v. Papazoni, 596 A.2d 1276, 1276–77 
(Vt. 1991) (requiring the government to prove, as an element of “driving under the influence, death 
resulting,” that there was a “nexus between defendant’s intoxicated state and the collision”); State v. 
Bartlett, 355 S.E.2d 913, 916–17 (W. Va. 1987) (approving a jury instruction that required the 
government to prove, as an element of section 17C-5-2(a) of the West Virginia Code, that the 
defendant-driver’s “intoxication was a contributing cause of [the victim’s] death”); Hodgins v. State, 
706 P.2d 655, 657 (Wyo. 1985) (interpreting a statute to require that the impairment of the driver was a 
cause of the victim’s death). 
18 State v. Rivas, 896 P.2d 57, 62 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); see also People v. Acosta, 860 P.2d 
1376, 1381 (Colo. App. 1993) (holding that “under the vehicular homicide statute, it is not necessary to 
establish that the intoxication was the proximate cause of the victim’s death”); State v. Van Hubbard, 
751 So. 2d 552, 558 (Fla. 1999) (holding that “the state is not required to prove that the operator’s 
drinking caused the accident”); People v. Martin, 955 N.E.2d 1058, 1064–65 (Ill. 2011) (holding that 
when a DUI homicide charge is based on proof that the driver’s blood-alcohol level exceeded the 
statutory limit, the charge requires “a causal link only between the physical act of driving and another 
person’s death”); Micinski v. State, 487 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. 1986) (holding that the offense of 
“driving under the influence resulting in serious bodily injury” does not require proof that the driver’s 
intoxication caused the injury); State v. Adams, 810 N.W.2d 365, 371 (Iowa 2012) (holding that Iowa’s 
drunk-driving homicide statute “does not impose a burden on the State to prove a specific causal 
connection between the defendant’s intoxication and the victim’s death”); People v. Schaefer, 703 
N.W.2d 774, 777, 784 (Mich. 2005) (holding that a statute defining the offense of “operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of liquor and causing death” does not require the State to prove that 
intoxication contributed to death); State v. Benoit, 650 A.2d 1230, 1233–34 (R.I. 1995) (holding that a 
statute that defines the offense of “[d]riving under the influence of liquor or drugs, resulting in serious 
bodily injury” does not require proof of the “defendant’s intoxication as a causal element of the offense 
but merely requires that the defendant be legally intoxicated at the time of the accident”); State v. 
Caibaiosai, 363 N.W.2d 574, 575, 578 (Wis. 1985) (interpreting a statute that defines the offense of 
“homicide by an intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle” not to require proof of a “causal connection 
between the defendant’s intoxication and death”). 
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 
reporters’ note cmt. c. 
20 See Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
333, 380, 385 (2002) (arguing that “risk analysis” in tort and contract law is both conceptually 
incoherent and normatively undesirable); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and 
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is tempting to suppose, then, that the courts in the drunk-driving homicide 
cases are simply taking sides in this debate.  And it is tempting to suppose, 
too, that the divide among the courts is no more bridgeable than the divide 
among the tort scholars. 
The cases themselves do not bear out this view of the issue, however.  
Instead, the cases suggest that the courts on both sides of this seeming 
divide are stumbling toward a common approach.  Among courts that 
purport to have rejected the scope-of-the-risk limitation, many have 
permitted the scope-of-the-risk limitation to re-enter through the 
backdoor—in the form of a mysterious requirement that the accident result 
from the defendant’s “misoperation” or “manner of operating.”21  By the 
same token, among courts that purport to have adopted a strict scope-of-
the-risk requirement, some have moderated this requirement by demanding 
less than a “but-for” causal connection between the defendant’s 
intoxication and the accident.22  On both sides of the seeming divide, then, 
the courts’ intuitions appear to be pushing them toward middle ground.   
What the courts appear to have recognized intuitively is that most 
drunk-driving homicide cases are “causal-overdetermination” cases, at 
least where the scope-of-the-risk question is concerned.  Courts and 
scholars long have recognized that a defendant’s conduct will qualify as a 
factual cause if it contributes incrementally to the causal mechanism 
behind the victim’s injury, even if the defendant’s contribution is not itself 
a “but-for” cause of the injury—even if, in other words, the result is 
“overdetermined” by the various contributions to the causal mechanism.23  
This causal-overdetermination principle would be implicated, for example, 
in a case where (1) three different actors independently administered equal 
doses of poison to their intended victim and (2) any two of the three doses 
                                                                                                                          
Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1266–69 (2009) (“[S]erious questions exist 
regarding not only whether the scope-of-the-risk standard is justifiable but also whether it is 
coherent.”). 
21 See Van Hubbard, 751 So. 2d at 563 (misoperation); Benoit, 650 A.2d at 1234 (manner of 
operating).   
22 See infra Part V. 
23 See, e.g., United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 98 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Proximate cause exists 
where the tortious conduct of multiple actors has combined to bring about harm, even if the harm 
suffered by the plaintiff might be the same if one of the numerous tortfeasors had not committed the 
tort.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 27 cmt. b (“Courts and scholars have long recognized the problem of overdetermined harm—harm 
produced by multiple sufficient causes . . . .”); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that a defendant is not liable for negligent conduct unless 
the plaintiff’s injury would not have occurred in its absence); NAT’L COMM’N ON REFORM OF FED. 
CRIMINAL LAWS, A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 305 (1971) (“Causation may be 
found where the result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the accused operating either 
alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce 
the result and the conduct of the accused clearly insufficient.”). 
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would have sufficed to bring about the victim’s death.24  In this 
hypothetical, none of the three actors’ contributions was necessary to bring 
about the victim’s death.  Still, each actor’s conduct would count as a 
factual cause of the victim’s death, because each actor’s conduct 
contributed incrementally to the causal mechanism that brought about the 
victim’s death.25 
Most drunk-driving homicide cases are just like this poisoning 
hypothetical.  In the usual drunk-driving homicide, the causal mechanism 
behind the fatal accident is the interplay of roadway hazards with 
limitations on the driver’s ability to perceive and react.  The wrongful-
aspect of the drunk driver’s conduct—his intoxication—contributes to this 
mechanism by diminishing his ability to perceive and react.  And so, on 
this analysis, the driver’s intoxication counts as a cause of the victim’s 
death, regardless of whether it was necessary—regardless, that is, of 
whether the driver’s intoxication “overdetermined” the fatal accident.  This 
analysis of the drunk-driving homicide cases appears to explain why courts 
on both sides of the causal-nexus question have proved uncomfortable with 
the positions they have staked out.  The right answer to the causal-nexus 
question lies neither in the outright rejection of the scope-of-the-risk 
limitation nor in a strict requirement that the government prove a but-for 
causal connection between the defendant’s intoxication and the accident.  
It lies, rather, in a requirement only that, under the circumstances, the 
driver’s intoxication contributed incrementally to the causal mechanism 
behind the fatal accident.   
The argument will proceed as follows: In Parts II and III, I will explain 
first one and then the other of two distinct components of the scope-of-the-
risk limitation.  In Part IV, I will explain why the wrongful-aspect test, 
which seems merely to be a refinement of the but-for test, really is a 
variant of the scope-of-the-risk limitation.  In Parts V and VI, I will 
examine the drunk-driving homicide cases: first in states where the courts 
purport to have adopted the scope-of-the-risk limitation and then in states 
where the courts purport to have rejected it.  In Parts VII and VIII, I will 
formulate the rule on which these two groups of courts appear to be 
converging: namely, a requirement that the wrongful-aspect of the 
defendant’s conduct contribute incrementally to the causal mechanism 
behind the fatal accident.  Finally, in Part IX, I will explain why this rule 
appears to be part of a broader trend in the evolution of criminal law. 
                                                                                                                          
24 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 
reporters’ note cmt. f (discussing “multiple insufficient incremental tortious acts as factual causes”). 
25 Id. 
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II.  THE CAUSAL LINK COMPONENT OF THE  
SCOPE-OF-THE-RISK LIMITATION 
Causation doctrine is “more developed” in tort than in criminal law, as 
Judge Posner has said.26  This is especially true where the scope-of-the-risk 
limitation is concerned.  Though the Model Penal Code includes a rough 
variant of the scope-of-the-risk limitation,27 the Code’s formulation has 
had little influence on state criminal codes28 and has rightly been criticized 
by scholars as, among other things, “unnecessarily complex (and 
misleading).”29   
By contrast, the Restatement (Third) of Torts distills the complex 
intuitions underlying the scope-of-the-risk limitation into a strikingly 
simple formula: “An actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result 
from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”30  As the comments 
to the Restatement explain, this formula requires the jury first to identify 
“the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious”—or wrongful31—and 
then to decide whether the harm at issue “was a result of any of those 
risks.”32 
Though neither the Restatement nor its comments say so explicitly, the 
phrase “the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious” really captures 
                                                                                                                          
26 Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 82 (7th Cir. 1993). 
27 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2)–(3) (1985); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 reporters’ note cmt. d (“The Model Penal Code 
rejects traditional use of proximate-cause language and adopts as the central limitation on guilt a 
standard very similar to the one adopted in § 29.”). 
28 For a few states that appear to have adopted statutes closely patterned on Model Penal 
Code § 2.03, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-203(A) (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 261 
(2007); HAW. REV. STAT.  § 702-214 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.060(1) (West 2006); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 45-2-201 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-3 (West 2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 303 (West 1998). 
29 Paul H. Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A Top Ten List, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 225, 240 (1997); see also H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 398 (2d ed. 
1985) (criticizing the Model Penal Code provision for failing to “provide specifically for those cases 
where causal problems arise because, although the accused did not intend it, another human action 
besides the accused’s is involved in the production of the proscribed harm”).  Also among the 
shortcomings of the Model Penal Code provision is its conflation of the scope-of-the-risk question with 
the foreseeability question.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(3) (restricting liability to cases where the 
victim’s injury is “within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of negligence, of which he 
should be aware”).  As Judge Friendly explained in In re Kinsman Transit Co., an outcome might be 
attributable to “the very risks that rendered [the defendant’s] conduct negligent” and still be 
“other . . . than . . . fairly foreseeable.”  338 F.2d 708, 723–24 (2d Cir. 1964). 
30 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29. 
31 See John C.P. Goldberg, Comment, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just Compensation: Weinstein 
on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2061 (1997) (formulating the scope-of-the-risk limitation as “the 
rule that one should be held responsible only for harms flowing from the realization of the sort of risks 
that led society to regard the conduct as wrongful in the first place”). 
32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 
cmt. d. 
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two different limitations.  The first limitation, which Judge Calabresi has 
referred to both in his scholarly writing and in his judicial opinions as the 
“causal-link” requirement, precludes liability unless the defendant’s 
conduct is of a kind that “increases the chances of such harm occurring in 
general.”33  Put somewhat differently, this first limitation precludes 
liability where the victim’s harm is not part of the ex ante risk created or 
enhanced by the defendant’s conduct.  By comparison, the second 
limitation draws a distinction between two parts of the ex ante risk: (1) the 
part by virtue of which the conduct’s aggregate risks exceeded its 
aggregate benefits; and (2) the part of the risk that would have been posed 
even by a non-wrongful version of the defendant’s conduct.   
Courts in criminal cases rarely have articulated the first requirement—
the causal-link requirement—with any precision.  Judge Posner’s recent 
opinion for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Hatfield 34 is the 
exception.  In Hatfield, the court was called upon to interpret 
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), which imposes a sentence of life imprisonment 
on any defendant who distributes a Schedule I or II controlled substance “if 
death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance.”35  
Judge Posner said that this statute’s causation requirement would not be 
satisfied merely by evidence that the distribution of the drug was a but-for 
cause of the victim’s death.36  To make this point, Judge Posner 
constructed the following hypothetical: “Suppose a defendant sells an 
illegal drug to a person who, not wanting to be seen ingesting it, takes it 
into his bathroom, and while he is there the bathroom ceiling collapses and 
kills him.”37  As Judge Posner said, this case would satisfy the but-for test: 
“Had [the victim] not ingested the drug, he would not have been killed.”38  
At the same time, though, “it would be strange to think that the seller of the 
drug was punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).”39 
The trouble with imposing liability in the bathroom-ceiling case, as 
Judge Posner explained, is that the defendant’s distribution of the drug “did 
not increase the risk posed by the unsafe ceiling—did not increase the risk 
                                                                                                                          
33 Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 388 n.7 (2d Cir. 1998); see also United States v. 
Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 186 (2d Cir. 2002) (distinguishing “causal link” from “‘but for’ cause [and] 
‘proximate’ or ‘legal’ cause”); Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for 
Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 71 (1975) (“There is a causal link between an act or activity 
and an injury when we conclude on the basis of the available evidence that the recurrence of that act or 
activity will increase the chances that the injury will also occur.”).  
34 591 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2010). 
35 Id. at 947 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2006)). 
36 Id. at 948 (“Probably what the government’s lawyer meant is that a but-for cause is not always 
(in fact not often) a cause relevant to legal liability.  And that is true, and critical.”). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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that this sort of mishap would occur.”40  To put this slightly differently: 
Both in criminal law and in tort, the risks that make a defendant’s conduct 
wrongful are ex ante risks—risks evaluated as of “the time the defendant 
acted”41 and on the basis of just those circumstances that were “known to 
him.”42  From the perspective of the drug dealer ex ante, the sale of the 
drug to the victim did not increase the risk posed by unsafe ceilings.  
Under the circumstances known to him, the bathroom ceiling was no more 
likely to collapse than was the ceiling of the room the victim would have 
occupied but for the drug sale.  And so the risk of a ceiling collapse was 
not among the risks that made the defendant’s conduct wrongful. 
Though this causal-link limitation rarely is implicated in real-world 
drunk-driving cases, it is easy to construct drunk-driving hypotheticals that 
share the structure of the bathroom-ceiling hypothetical.  Suppose, for 
example, that a legally intoxicated driver stops to pick up a hitchhiker on a 
remote country road.  And suppose that when the two have traveled about 
five miles, a malfunctioning single-engine airplane plunges from the sky, 
striking the defendant’s car and killing the passenger.  In this hypothetical, 
the defendant’s drunk driving obviously was a but-for cause of the 
hitchhiker’s death; if the defendant had decided against driving, the 
hitchhiker would not have been in the spot where the plane crashed.  Still, 
it would be “absurd” to impose homicide liability on the defendant, as the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court said of roughly this hypothetical case in State 
v. Benoit.43  The reason it would be absurd is, in Judge Calabresi’s words, 
that the driver’s conduct did not “increase[] the chances of such harm 
occurring in general.”44  From any but an omniscient perspective, the 
hitchhiker was no more likely to be killed by a malfunctioning single-
engine plane in the place where the driver had taken him than in the place 
where the driver had picked him up.45  
Finally, it deserves emphasis that this causal-link requirement is 
different from, and more fundamental than, any requirement that the 
                                                                                                                          
40 Id.; see also Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 388 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Causal link says 
that, even if defendant’s wrong was a but for cause of the injury in a given case, no liability ensues 
unless defendant’s wrong increases the chances of such harm occurring in general.”).   
41 Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 388 n.7. 
42 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 75 (1881); see also MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.03(2)(c)–(d) (1985) (providing that the degree of risk posed by the defendant’s conduct in 
cases of negligence and recklessness is calculated on the basis of “the circumstances known to him”). 
43 650 A.2d 1230, 1233 (R.I. 1994).   
44 Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 388 n.7. 
45Cf. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 29, at 121–22 (suggesting that cases like these might best be 
addressed by a separate rule “that a factor, which is merely sufficient to secure the presence of a person 
or thing at a given place at a time different from what it would otherwise have been, is not to be treated 
as causally connected with the ensuing accident, unless the risk of the accident occurring at that 
different time was greater”). 
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victim’s harm be “foreseeable.”46  In the malfunctioning plane and 
bathroom-ceiling hypotheticals, the trouble wasn’t that the defendants 
could not have foreseen that their conduct would increase the risk to their 
victims from defective ceilings and malfunctioning single-engine airplanes.  
Rather, the problem was that their conduct did not increase those risks at 
all.  The very notions of risk and probability presuppose “a perspective that 
is defined by possession of certain information but not other 
information.”47  If we knew everything there was to know about the 
objective facts—“all the forces by which nature is animated and the 
respective situation of the beings who compose it”48—most probabilities 
and risks would give way to certainties.49  In criminal law and tort, the law 
resolves this difficulty by calculating risks on the basis of just those 
background facts that were known to the defendant at “the time the 
defendant acted.”50  Since neither the structural deficiency of the bathroom 
ceiling nor the trajectory of the malfunctioning plane was among the 
background facts known to the defendants in our hypothetical cases, the 
defendants’ conduct in those cases could not, in the relevant sense, be said 
to have increased the risks from collapsing ceilings or plummeting 
airplanes.  This is why the victims’ injuries in these cases cannot be said to 
have resulted from risks that made the defendants’ conduct wrongful. 
III.  THE DETERMINATIVE-RISK COMPONENT OF THE 
SCOPE-OF-THE-RISK LIMITATION 
So the first component of the scope-of-the-risk limitation—the causal-
link component—requires the fact finder merely to decide whether 
outcomes like the victim’s were any part of the ex ante risk created or 
enhanced by the defendant’s conduct.  It requires the fact finder merely to 
map the outer boundary of the ex ante risk, in other words.  In contrast, the 
                                                                                                                          
46 See Zipursky, supra note 20, at 1254 (“[The] scope of the risk and foreseeability are not quite 
the same.”).  In In re Kinsman Transit Co., Judge Friendly explained that foreseeability and scope of 
the risk are different questions.  338 F.2d 708, 723 (2d Cir. 1964).  An outcome might be attributable to 
“the very risks that rendered [the defendant’s] conduct negligent,” he said, and still not be “fairly 
foreseeable.”  Id. at 723–24.  Judge Friendly also declined to adopt a foreseeability requirement to 
supplement the scope-of-the-risk requirement, stating that “where, as here, the damages resulted from 
the same physical forces whose existence required the exercise of greater care than was displayed and 
were of the same general sort that was expectable, unforeseeability of the exact developments and the 
extent of the loss will not limit liability.”  Id. at 726. 
47 LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 28 (2009); see also Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en 
banc) (concluding that a stalking statute’s use of the phrase “reasonably likely” was ambiguous because 
the statute did not specify the perspective from which this probability determination was to be made).   
48 PIERRE SIMON, MARQUIS DE LAPLACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON PROBABILITIES 4 
(Frederick Wilson Truscott & Frederick Lincoln Emory, trans., John Wiley & Sons 1902) (1814). 
49 Id. at 7.  
50 Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 388 n.7 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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second component of the scope-of-the-risk limitation requires the fact 
finder to distinguish between two parts of the ex ante risk: (1) the part by 
virtue of which the conduct’s aggregate risks exceeded its aggregate 
benefits; and (2) the part of the risk that would have been posed even by a 
non-wrongful version of the defendant’s conduct. 
By way of illustration, suppose that Richard, a duck hunter, is walking 
home from a day in the field when he decides to stop by the home of a 
friend.  His friend’s nine-year-old daughter, Kim, answers the door, and 
Richard hands his loaded shotgun to Kim as he enters the house.  Kim 
drops the shotgun, which lands on her toe, breaking the toe.  In this 
hypothetical (variations of which appear in both the Second and Third 
Restatements of Torts),51 Richard plainly is negligent in handing the 
shotgun to Kim.  But the risk that makes his conduct wrongful—the risk by 
virtue of which the conduct’s aggregate risks exceed its aggregate 
benefits—is the risk that Kim will accidentally shoot herself or someone 
else with the gun, not that she will drop the gun on her toe.52  Thus, 
according to the Restatement’s comment, “Kim’s broken toe is outside the 
scope of Richard’s liability, even though Richard’s tortious conduct was a 
factual cause of Kim’s harm.”53  
Notice, first, that the injury to Kim’s toe, in addition to satisfying the 
factual-cause requirement, also satisfies the causal-link requirement.  From 
an ex ante perspective, Richard’s conduct “increase[d] the chances of such 
harm occurring in general.”54  Shotguns are heavy; on average, they weigh 
seven to eight pounds.  And so, under the circumstances known to Richard, 
his decision to hand the shotgun to Kim increased, if only slightly, the 
likelihood that she would break her toe by dropping something heavy on 
it.55  Granted, the risk of such accidents usually does not deter even 
cautious adults from handing heavy objects to nine-year-old children.  The 
reason, though, is that the cost of precautions designed to stem this slight 
risk—the cost both in terms of limits on the activities of children and in 
terms of the mental effort adults would devote to implementing these 
limits—outweighs the risk posed to children by the handling of eight 
pound objects. 
                                                                                                                          
51 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. 
d, illus. 3 (2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. f, illus. 3 (1965). 
52 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. 
d, illus. 3. 
53 Id. 
54 Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 388 n.7. 
55 Compare Zipursky, supra note 20, at 1254 (“[I]t is not unforeseeable that a child might drop a 
gun on someone’s foot.”), with Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability 
for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 993 n.133 (2001) (“[W]e could explain the outcome on the 
basis that the handing over of the gun would have seemed careless to an observer at the time because it 
seemed to increase the risk of wounding by gunshot but would not have seemed to increase the risk of 
an injury from a dropped object (unless, for example, the gun was exceptionally heavy).”). 
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This, as it turns out, is why Kim’s broken toe does not satisfy the 
second component of the scope-of-the-risk rule—the requirement that the 
victim’s injury result from those ex ante risks by virtue of which the 
conduct’s aggregate risks outweighed its aggregate benefits.  The risks 
posed to Kim by the shotgun’s weight would not, by themselves, outweigh 
the benefits to Richard of handing her the shotgun as he entered her 
family’s dwelling.  What made Richard’s conduct wrongful—what tipped 
the balance of aggregate risks and aggregate benefits—was the risk that the 
loaded shotgun would discharge accidentally.  But this risk, again, did not 
play a role in bringing about Kim’s injuries. 
This distinction between determinative risks and non-determinative 
risks is not wholly unproblematic.56  When the fact finder undertakes to 
decide whether the risks posed by the defendant’s conduct outweighed its 
benefits, he or she will aggregate all the risks and benefits of the conduct.57  
Moreover, it seems at first glance as though every part of this aggregate 
risk is just as potentially determinative as every other part.58  In other 
words, it seems as though it would always be possible mentally to 
rearrange the various risks in such a way as to make any risk, even the risk 
of a broken toe, into the determinative risk—the risk by virtue of which the 
aggregate risks finally exceeded the aggregate benefits.  On this view of 
things, every part of the risk is equally among “the risks that make the 
conduct wrongful,” just as in a close election where every vote for the 
winning candidate is equally the vote that determined the election’s 
outcome.59  And so the question posed by the scope-of-the-risk 
limitation—whether the victim’s injury was within the risk that made the 
conduct wrongful—seems undecidable. 
But this objection appears to be wrong.  The trouble with the objection 
is that risks, unlike votes, are lumpy.  Precautions generally do not 
eliminate adverse outcomes one at a time.  Rather, they eliminate great 
lumps of similar outcomes.  In the shotgun case, for example, unloading 
                                                                                                                          
56 See Hurd & Moore, supra note 20, at 365–74 (arguing that “it would appear that all harms are 
within the risks that make a defendant’s conduct negligent” and rejecting “five possible distinctions” 
designed to differentiate determinative from non-determinative risks). 
57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 
cmt. e (explaining that the Restatement’s test for negligence “suggest[s] a ‘risk-benefit test’ for 
negligence, where the ‘risk’ is the overall level of the foreseeable risk created by the actor’s conduct 
and the ‘benefit’ is the advantages that the actor or others gain if the actor refrains from taking 
precautions”).   
58 See Hurd & Moore, supra note 20, at 365 (“[I]f all harms, discounted by their probability, are 
to be included in the calculus of risk, then it would appear that any harm that happens as a result of a 
defendant’s unjustified conduct is within the risks that make the defendant’s conduct unjustified.”). 
59 See Michael Herz, How the Electoral College Imitates the World Series, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1191, 1214 n.53 (2002) (“No vote or bloc of votes within a winning total is more or less ‘decisive’ than 
any other.  The baseball analogy here is not the World Series but the sport’s short-lived and 
appropriately abandoned use of the ‘game-winning run batted in’ statistic.”). 
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the shotgun would eliminate a large number of similar risks, among them: 
(1) the risk that Kim would accidentally discharge the gun into the kitchen, 
killing her father, who was cooking breakfast; (2) the risk that Kim would 
accidentally discharge the gun into the ceiling, injuring her brother, who 
was sleeping in an upstairs bedroom; and (3) the risk that Kim, supposing 
the gun to be unloaded, would injure herself by pulling trigger in jest.  For 
this reason, it is easy to imagine a counterfactual version of Richard’s 
conduct where the aggregate benefits of his conduct outweigh the risks—
where Richard’s conduct is not wrongful—but where Kim still drops the 
gun on her toe, breaking it.60  We need merely suppose that he unloaded 
the gun before he handed it to her. 
In contrast, it is impossible to construct a counterfactual version of 
Richard’s conduct where the aggregate benefits of his conduct outweigh 
the risks and yet Kim still, say, shoots her brother accidentally through the 
ceiling.  In order to reduce sufficiently the aggregate risk posed by 
Richard’s conduct in this counterfactual universe, we would need to 
eliminate, through some imagined precaution or another, lots of risks that 
closely resemble the risk that actually comes to fruition in the injury to 
Kim’s brother.  We would need to eliminate, for example, the risk that Kim 
would accidentally shoot her father as he worked in the kitchen, and the 
risk that Kim would injure herself by pulling the gun’s trigger in jest.  The 
trouble is: the least costly and only obvious way of eliminating these 
risks—namely, unloading the shotgun—also would eliminate the risk to 
Kim’s brother upstairs.  Even if we could conceive of some elaborate 
measure by which Richard might eliminate all of the risks posed by the 
loaded shotgun except the risk of Kim shooting her brother through the 
ceiling, this elaborate measure would be more costly than the simple 
expedient of unloading the gun.  Given the availability of the less costly 
and safer alternative of unloading the gun, the adoption of any other course 
of conduct—any course of conduct that left the risk to Kim’s brother 
unabated—would necessarily be wrongful.  The risk that Kim will shoot 
her brother through the ceiling is necessarily among the risks that make 
Richard’s conduct wrongful, then. 
This distinction between determinative and non-determinative risks 
also appears to be defensible in the drunk-driving homicide cases.  
Consider this hypothetical case, which was incorporated into a legislative 
                                                                                                                          
60 This is roughly how some torts scholars conceive of the fact finder’s task in applying the scope-
of-the-risk limitation.  See Robert N. Strassfeld, If . . . : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 339, 401 (1992) (explaining that the fact finder, in constructing the counterfactual version of the 
defendant’s conduct, should change the facts “only enough to make [the defendant’s conduct] conform 
to the legal standard”).  In this view, the fact finder constructs a counterfactual version of the 
defendant’s conduct in which the conduct is minimally lawful and then asks whether the same result 
would have occurred in this counterfactual universe. 
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staff report on Florida’s vehicular homicide statute: “An intoxicated person 
drives an automobile to an intersection and properly stops at a stop light.  
While there in a stationary position, the vehicle is struck from behind by 
another automobile due to negligent operation by the driver.  The negligent 
driver dies from injuries received in the collision.”61  In this scenario, as in 
the shotgun hypothetical, the defendant’s wrongful conduct is a factual 
cause of the victim’s injury: the accident would not have occurred if the 
defendant had stayed home, say, instead of driving drunk.  At the same 
time, the victim’s death in this drunk-driving hypothetical—like Kim’s 
broken toe in the shotgun hypothetical—seems not to result from the risks 
that made the drunk driver’s conduct wrongful.  What makes drunk driving 
wrongful, we want to say, are the risks attributable to the drunk driver’s 
intoxication—for example, the risk that the driver’s impairment will make 
him cross the highway’s center line and strike an oncoming car.   
To put this somewhat more rigorously: It is easy to construct a 
counterfactual version of the stoplight case where (1) the aggregate 
benefits of the defendant’s conduct outweigh the aggregate risks and yet 
(2) the other driver still runs into the back of the defendant’s car.  We 
merely would subtract counterfactually the defendant’s intoxication.  Thus, 
the risk of being rear-ended at a stoplight is among the risks that would 
have been posed even by a non-wrongful version of the defendant’s 
conduct.  It is not, then, among the risks by virtue of which the conduct’s 
aggregate risks exceeded its aggregate benefits; it is not among the risks 
that made the driver’s conduct wrongful.  What this means, finally, is that 
we can coherently say of some drunk-driving cases that the victim’s injury 
did not result from the risks that made the defendant’s conduct wrongful. 
Equally, though, it is possible to identify drunk-driving cases where 
the risk that comes to fruition is part of the determinative risk.  Suppose, 
for example, that a driver’s intoxication causes him to cross the road’s 
center line and strike an oncoming motorist.  It would be impossible to 
construct a counterfactual version of this case where (1) the aggregate 
benefits of the defendant’s conduct outweigh the aggregate risks and (2) 
the defendant’s intoxication still causes him to cross the center line and 
strike an oncoming motorist.  The risk of drunkenly crossing the center line 
is part of a lump of related risks that are most cheaply addressed by the 
simple expedient of refraining from drinking to excess in the hours before 
driving.  Even if we could imagine some alternative measure by which the 
driver could eliminate all of the other risks associated with drunk driving 
without at the same time eliminating the risk of drunkenly crossing the 
center line, this alternative would be more costly and less safe than 
                                                                                                                          
61 Magaw v. State, 537 So. 2d 564, 566–67 (Fla. 1989) (Boyd, J., dissenting) (quoting Baker v. 
State, 377 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla. 1979)). 
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eliminating the entire lump of risks at once—it would be more costly and 
less safe than simply refraining from drinking.  In this case, then, the injury 
to the oncoming driver can coherently be said to have resulted from the 
risks that made the defendant’s conduct wrongful.  
IV.  WRONGFUL-ASPECT CAUSATION AS A VARIANT OF  
THE SCOPE-OF-THE-RISK LIMITATION 
In cases where courts adopt or reject the scope-of-the-risk limitation, 
they rarely formulate the limitation just as the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
does.  In other words, they rarely ask specifically whether the law requires 
the government to prove that the victim’s injury “result[ed] from the risks 
that made the actor’s conduct [wrongful].”62  Instead, they usually pose the 
question using a common variant of the scope-of-the-risk limitation: the 
wrongful-aspect test.63   
The wrongful-aspect test requires the fact finder first to identify the 
specific factual circumstance that made the defendant’s conduct wrongful 
and then to determine whether that circumstance was itself a factual cause 
of the victim’s harm.64  In the Restatement’s loaded-shotgun hypothetical, 
for example, the wrongful-aspect test would require the fact finder to 
decide whether the victim’s injury was caused by the fact that the shotgun 
was loaded.  In a drunk-driving homicide case, it would require the fact 
finder to decide whether the victim’s death was caused by the fact that the 
defendant was legally intoxicated. 
In its usual formulation, the wrongful-aspect test resembles the 
traditional but-for test.65  The two tests are alike, first, in that both require 
                                                                                                                          
62 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29. 
63 See id. at § 29 reporters’ note cmt. d (identifying the wrongful-aspect test as a variant of the 
scope-of-the-risk limitation); Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal 
Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1083 (2001) 
(commenting that “courts have clearly rejected” the Restatement-type approach in favor of requiring 
the plaintiff to “prove that the tortious aspect of the defendant’s conduct contributed to the plaintiff’s 
injury”); see also, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 390 (2d Cir. 1998) (formulating the 
scope-of-the-risk question as whether the wrongful aspect of the defendant doctor’s conduct—namely, 
the amount by which the drug dose administered to the patient by the doctor exceeded the dose 
recommended by the Food and Drug Administration—was “a but for cause of Mrs. Zuchowicz’s 
illness”); Commonwealth v. Molinaro, 631 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (requiring the 
government to prove, as an element of “homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence,” that 
the defendant’s “intoxication was a direct and substantial cause of the accident”); Hale v. State, 194 
S.W.3d 39, 42 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that, in order to prove intoxication manslaughter, the State 
must prove that driver’s “intoxication, not just his operation of a vehicle, caused the fatal result”). 
64 See Eric A. Johnson, Causal Relevance in the Law of Search and Seizure, 88 B.U. L. REV. 113, 
124–32 (2008) (discussing in relation to a Fourth Amendment issue both the wrongful-aspect test and 
its relationship to the scope-of-the-risk limitation).    
65 See Fleming James Jr. & Roger F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 789 (1951) (“Under 
this approach the court asks whether the same injury would have been caused if defendant’s conduct 
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the fact finder to answer a question roughly of the form, “Would Y have 
occurred if X had not?”66  In both tests, moreover, Y represents the injury 
for which the government or the plaintiff would hold the defendant liable.  
The difference between the two tests lies in the nature of X—the 
subtrahend.67  Under the traditional but-for test, what the fact finder 
subtracts counterfactually is the defendant’s “conduct.”68  Under the 
wrongful-aspect test, by contrast, what the fact finder subtracts is “that 
aspect of the defendant’s conduct which is wrongful.”69 
To illustrate, consider again the case of State v. Rumsey.70  In applying 
the traditional but-for test to the Rumsey case, the fact finder would 
counterfactually subtract Glenda Rumsey’s “conduct,” i.e., the event that 
consisted of Rumsey driving drunk.  In other words, the fact finder would 
determine simply whether Jose Rincon would have been killed if Rumsey 
had not driven her car home that night but instead had, say, remained at the 
bar.  Under the wrongful-aspect test, by contrast, the fact finder would 
counterfactually subtract not Rumsey’s conduct but her intoxication, since 
her intoxication was “the aspect of the conduct that [made] it wrongful.”71  
The question for the fact finder then would be whether, but for Rumsey’s 
intoxication, Rincon would have been killed that day.  If, as Rumsey 
argued, the fatal accident was attributable exclusively to the defective 
design of the intersection where the accident occurred, then she would be 
entitled to an acquittal.72 
It would be natural to suppose—as Justice Breyer did in a recent 
search-and-seizure case—that the difference between the wrongful-aspect 
                                                                                                                          
had been careful (or not violative of statute) but in all other respects had been the same as it actually 
was.”). 
66 HART & HONORÉ, supra note 29, at 110.  Hart and Honoré posed this question for the “cause in 
fact” test.  Id.; cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (1985) (formulating but-for test to provide that X is the 
cause of a result when X “is an antecedent but for which the result in question [Y] would not have 
occurred”).  
67 Strassfeld, supra note 60, at 398–99. 
68 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1). 
69 James & Perry, supra note 65, at 789. 
70 See supra text accompanying notes 1–8. 
71 Johnson, supra note 64, at 126. 
72 Application of the wrongful-aspect test is not always this easy.  See David Howarth, “O 
Madness of Discourse, That Cause Sets Up with and Against Itself!,” 96 YALE L.J. 1389, 1413 n.110 
(1987) (reviewing HART & HONORÉ, supra note 29) (observing that proponents of the wrongful-aspect 
approach “fail to appreciate that . . . there are always two ways of acting lawfully: Carry on as before, 
but obey the statute . . . or refrain completely from the activity in question”); David W. Robertson, The 
Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1770 (1997) (acknowledging that the 
preliminary task of identifying the conduct’s wrongful aspect is “trick[y]”).  Application of the test is 
particularly difficult where the defendant’s conduct has multiple wrongful aspects, as where the 
defendant both drives while intoxicated and exceeds the posted speed limit.  Richard W. Wright, 
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1768 n.135 (1985) (“When there is more than one 
tortious aspect, each must be considered, and the tortious-aspect causation requirement is satisfied if 
any of them contributed.”).   
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test and the traditional event-based version of the but-for test lies in how 
finely the fact finder “slice[s]” the defendant’s wrongdoing.73  But the 
difference between the two tests is not a matter of degree; it is not a 
question of adopting one or another level of precision in “slicing” the 
wrongdoing into discrete events.74  “It is, rather, a [question] of deciding 
whether to frame the counterfactual antecedent in terms of an event, 
however narrowly sliced, or in terms of a fact about the event.”75   
In Rumsey’s case, for example, a fact finder applying the traditional 
but-for test might identify the relevant conduct as, e.g., setting out to drive 
home from the bar that night, or, alternatively and more precisely, as 
Rumsey’s continued operation of the car in the moment immediately 
before the accident.  But the fact finder cannot, merely by increasing his or 
her level of precision, “slice off” Rumsey’s intoxication in the moment of 
the accident as a separate event.76  True, Rumsey’s intoxication is a 
consequence of an earlier event, namely, Rumsey’s drinking on the day of 
the accident.  But this earlier act of drinking is not the basis for liability.  
Rather, the basis for liability is Rumsey’s intoxication when she engaged in 
the conduct of driving.  This intoxication is not itself an event but rather is 
a fact about—an aspect of—the conduct of driving.  In the terminology of 
the Model Penal Code, the intoxication is an “attendant circumstance” 
rather than a “conduct” element.77 
Not only are the wrongful-aspect test and the traditional event-based 
but-for test different; they also play different roles.  The courts treat the 
event-based version of the but-for test as defining the basic, threshold 
requirement of factual causation both in criminal law and in tort.78  And 
they treat the scope-of-the-risk limitation, in all its variant forms, as a 
                                                                                                                          
73 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 615 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
majority, in “separating the ‘manner of entry’ from the related search” in a knock-and-announce case, 
had “slice[d] the violation too finely”). 
74 Johnson, supra note 64, at 127. 
75 Id.; see also J.L. MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE 248–69 (1974) (explaining the 
difference between two distinct kinds of statements about causation, one of which takes “concrete 
occurrences” as causes and the other of which takes “facts, rather than events,” as causes); Robertson, 
supra note 72, at 1770–71 (treating the identification of the conduct’s wrongful aspect as distinct from 
the preliminary step of “fixing as precisely as possible the piece of conduct—the exact act or 
omission—with which the defendant is charged”). 
76 Johnson, supra note 64, at 127. 
77 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 (1985) (defining “element of an offense” to include both 
“conduct” elements and “attendant circumstance” elements); MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: 
MODEL PENAL CODE 43–44 (2002) (explaining the Model Penal Code’s use of the term “attendant 
circumstance” and identifying “under the influence of alcohol” as an attendant-circumstance element). 
78 See Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 389–90 (2d Cir. 1998) (addressing the threshold 
question of whether the “defendant’s act in giving Mrs. Zuchowicz Danocrine was the source of her 
illness and death,” before addressing (in a separate section of the opinion) the question of whether “it 
was not just the Danocrine, but its negligent overdose that led to Mrs. Zuchowicz’s demise”).   
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separate and additional limitation on liability.79   
This conventional division of labor is evident, for example, in the 
Model Penal Code.  Under the Code, the threshold requirement of factual 
causation is defined in terms of the “causal relationship between conduct 
and results.”80  Specifically, what the Code requires by way of factual 
causation is just that the actor’s “conduct” be “an antecedent but for which 
the result in question would not have occurred.”81  The Code also imposes 
a scope-of-the-risk limitation.82  But the Code treats this scope-of-the-risk 
limitation as posing a “[f]urther question[],” not as a refinement of the 
question posed by the threshold cause-in-fact inquiry.83 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts, too, adopts a traditional event-based 
version of the but-for test as its basic test of factual causation, while 
treating the scope-of-the-risk limitation as a separate, supplemental 
requirement.84  Section 26, which defines the basic requirement of “factual 
cause” in tort cases, requires the fact finder to answer the question whether 
the harm in question “would not have occurred absent the conduct.”85  The 
Restatement’s scope-of-the-risk limitation, meanwhile, appears not just in 
a different section but in a different chapter than the Restatement’s 
definition of factual cause.  This separation was deliberate, moreover.  A 
special note explains: “[T]his Restatement separates factual cause from 
scope-of-liability limitations and, to further that end, no longer employs an 
umbrella term [“proximate cause”] to encompass both concepts.”86 
All of this is just to say: When courts ask whether a defendant’s 
intoxication, as opposed to his driving, was a cause of the victim’s death or 
injury, they are applying a variant of the scope-of-the-risk limitation.  They 
are not just applying the traditional but-for test of factual causation. 
In the usual case, moreover, this wrongful-aspect variant will produce 
the same result as the Restatement’s risk-playout formulation.  In the 
shotgun hypothetical, for example, the fact finder would arrive at the same 
                                                                                                                          
79 Id. 
80 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1) (emphasis added) (defining circumstances under which 
“[c]onduct is the cause of a result”). 
81 Id.  
82 Id. § 2.03(2), (3). 
83 Id. § 2.03 cmt. at 258. 
84 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
cmt. a (2010).  
85 Id. (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965) (defining basic 
test of factual causation in terms of the relationship between the “actor’s conduct” and “[an]other’s 
harm”).  The comments to section 26 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts hedge occasionally on this 
question, at one point suggesting that in rare cases the test of factual causation must be applied to the 
tortious aspect of the conduct, rather than to the conduct itself.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. g (“For example, there may be no doubt 
that the actor’s agent or instrumentality caused another’s harm, but there may be a dispute about 
whether the tortious aspect of the actor’s conduct was a cause of the harm.”).  
86 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 492.  
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result under either test: Kim’s injury did not, in the Restatement’s 
formulation, result from the risks that made Richard’s conduct wrongful.87  
But neither did Kim’s injury result from the “wrongful aspect” of 
Richard’s conduct, that is, the fact that the shotgun was loaded.   
Likewise, the two tests will produce the same results in the 
malfunctioning-airplane hypothetical.  In this hypothetical case, recall, a 
single-engine airplane struck and killed a hitchhiker who had accepted a 
ride from a drunk driver.  The defendant’s conduct counted as a but-for 
cause of the hitchhiker’s injury, since the hitchhiker would not have been 
under the plane at the critical moment but for the driver’s conduct.  But the 
case did not satisfy the scope-of-the-risk limitation, since the driver’s 
conduct did not “increase[] the chances of such harm occurring in 
general.”88  A fact finder applying the wrongful-aspect test probably would 
arrive at the same result: the wrongful aspect of the driver’s conduct—his 
intoxication—appears to bear no causal relationship to the victim’s death. 
In rare cases, the wrongful-aspect test will produce results that depart 
both from the Restatement’s formulation of the scope-of-the-risk limitation 
and from the intuitions that underlie it.89  For example, some state 
legislatures have adopted statutes that make it a felony to cause injury or 
death while engaging in a particular activity—practicing medicine, say, or 
driving—without a required license.90  The Restatement formulation offers 
a plausible interpretation of these statutes—it limits liability under these 
statutes to cases where (1) the defendant’s “conduct” was a but-for cause 
of the death or injury; and (2) the death or injury resulted from the risks 
that led the legislature to make this conduct criminal, e.g., the risk that the 
unlicensed actor would be incompetent to engage in the licensed activity.91  
In contrast, adherents of the wrongful-aspect approach can do nothing with 
these cases.  In these cases, the “wrongful aspect” of the person’s conduct 
appears to be her lack of a license.  But as even proponents of the 
wrongful-aspect test have acknowledged, it is never really the case that an 
injury or death is “caused” by the fact that a person does not have a 
particular piece of paper.92 
                                                                                                                          
87 Id. § 29 cmt. d. 
88 Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 388 n.7 (2d Cir. 1998).  
89 Johnson, supra note 64, at 130; see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse 
in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 36 n.149 (“[T]here is a category of risk rule . . . cases that 
cannot plausibly be handled in this manner.”).  
90 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.065 (West 2007) (defining penalties and enforcement 
procedure for the unlicensed practice of medicine); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393(c) (West 2008) 
(defining homicide by motor vehicle); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.904(4) (2010) (restricting the 
operation of motor vehicles for those who do not possess a license). 
91 See MACKIE, supra note 75, at 265.   
92 See People v. Penny, 285 P.2d 926, 930 (Cal. 1955) (“It is extremely dubious that defendant’s 
lack of license had any causal connection with Mrs. Stanley’s death . . . .”); Strassfeld, supra note 60, at 
398 (arguing that courts “incorrectly identify the violation of a licensing law as a responsible cause of 
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Whatever its shortcomings, though, in the vast majority of cases the 
wrongful-aspect variant of the scope-of-the-risk limitation produces the 
same results as the Restatement variant.93  This is the critical point: The 
wrongful-aspect variant and the Restatement variant are designed to limit 
liability in exactly the same way.  This point will inform our reading of the 
drunk-driving homicide cases, as will our recognition that both variants are 
meant to supplement, not to displace, the “initial and very basic 
requirement” that the defendant’s conduct—“the defendant’s operation of 
his or her motor vehicle,” for example—qualify as a factual cause of the 
victim’s injury.94 
V.  THE CASES:  STATES THAT EXPLICITLY REQUIRE A CAUSAL NEXUS 
It is by way of the wrongful-aspect variant that courts in the drunk-
driving homicide cases have approached the question whether to impose a 
scope-of-the-risk limitation.  The question, the courts have said, is whether 
the government “is required to prove that the operator’s drinking caused 
the accident.”95  Of the state courts that have addressed this question, a 
slim majority has concluded that the answer to the question is yes.96  The 
Alaska Supreme Court, for example, has held that the government is 
required to prove “that the [driver’s] intoxication was the cause of the 
victim’s death.”97  Likewise, the Texas Court of Appeals has held that the 
government must prove that the driver’s “intoxication, not just his 
operation of a vehicle, caused the fatal result.”98 
What this holding appears to mean—at least at first glance—is that the 
                                                                                                                          
the accident” by erroneously specifying the counterfactual antecedent); Wright, supra note 72, at 1773 
(acknowledging that “[a]lthough the overall conduct of driving or practicing medicine contributed to 
the injury, the failure to have the required piece of paper (the license) did not”).  But see 
Commonwealth v. Samson, 196 A. 564, 568 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1938) (appearing to conclude that the 
Commonwealth had proved the requisite causal connection between a landlord’s failure to obtain a 
license to operate his premises as a tenant house and the death of seven tenants). 
93 HART & HONORÉ, supra note 29, at lxii–lxiii (characterizing the two variants as “equivalent to 
one another”); ROBERT KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 12 (1963) (acknowledging that 
the Restatement-type formulation of the scope-of-the-risk limitation poses “the same inquiry as the 
question whether there is causal relation between that aspect of the defendant’s conduct which is 
wrongful and the injury” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
94 State v. Benoit, 650 A.2d 1230, 1233 (R.I. 1994). 
95 Magaw v. State, 537 So. 2d 564, 567 (Fla. 1989); see also Commonwealth. v. Molinaro, 631 
A.2d 1040, 1042 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (addressing the question of whether the government is required 
to prove, as an element of “homicide by [motor] vehicle while under the influence [of alcohol],” that 
the defendant’s “intoxication was a direct and substantial cause of the accident”); Hale v. State, 194 
S.W.3d 39, 42 (Tex. App. 2006) (addressing the question of whether the government, in order to prove 
intoxication manslaughter, must prove that the driver’s “intoxication, not just his operation of a vehicle, 
caused the fatal result”).  
96 See supra note 20 (giving examples of cases that argue against the scope-of-the-risk limitation). 
97 Lupro v. State, 603 P.2d 468, 475 (Alaska 1979). 
98 Hale v. State, 194 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Tex. App. 2006). 
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government is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
victim’s death would not have occurred but for the defendant’s 
intoxication.  After all, the wrongful-aspect test appears to “ask a ‘but-for’ 
kind of question: ‘Is it the driver’s intoxication that caused him to hit the 
victim?’”99  Moreover, this wrongful-aspect element, like other elements of 
the government’s case, appears to require proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.100  The reasonable doubt standard is a demanding one, of course.  
With respect to the wrongful-aspect element, it would require the 
government to negate, by its evidence, any “real possibility” that the 
victim’s death still would have occurred if the defendant had been sober.101 
What the courts actually have required, though, is something less than 
this.  Consider, for example, the decision of the New Mexico Court of 
Appeals in State v. Guzman.102  Defendant Bertha Guzman left the Golden 
Spur Saloon in Magdalena, New Mexico, at about 2:00 a.m. after drinking 
six to eight beers.103  As she drove home on Elm Street, she struck and 
killed a pedestrian.104  When the police arrested Guzman about four hours 
later, her blood-alcohol level was still 0.13%, though she acknowledged 
not having consumed any alcoholic beverages after the accident.105  The 
government charged Guzman with vehicular homicide on the theory that 
she had killed the victim while driving under the influence of alcohol.106  
After a trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict.107  On appeal, Guzman 
challenged the sufficiency of the government’s evidence on the question of 
causation.  In particular, she argued that “there was no ‘[e]vidence of a 
causal link’ between [her] driving while intoxicated and the victim’s 
death.”108 
Guzman’s causation argument had a strong basis in precedent.  The 
New Mexico Supreme Court had adopted a scope-of-the-risk requirement 
six years earlier in State v. Munoz.109  In Munoz, where the government had 
charged the defendant under both a driving-while-intoxicated theory and a 
                                                                                                                          
99 Micinski v. State, 487 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. 1986). 
100 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute 
the crime with which he is charged.”). 
101 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 28 (1987) (recommending a 
reasonable doubt instruction that provides: “If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility 
that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty”), quoted in 
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 27 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
102 96 P.3d 1173, 1177–78 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). 
103 Id. at 1177. 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 Id. at 1178. 
107 Id.  
108 Id. (first alteration in original). 
109 970 P.2d 143, 149 (N.M. 1998). 
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recklessness theory,110 the court said that the government was required to 
prove that the fatal accident was connected causally either to the 
defendant’s intoxication or to his recklessness.  Specifically, the court said 
that the statute required the government to prove that the defendant “had 
the power to prevent the victim’s death by driving lawfully instead of 
recklessly or while intoxicated.”111  By implication, then, the same statute 
would have required the government to prove in Guzman’s case that the 
accident would not have occurred if Guzman “had not been intoxicated.”112   
Guzman’s causation defense also appears to have had a very strong 
basis in the evidence.  At trial, Guzman introduced evidence that the 
victim, who had left the Golden Spur just moments before Guzman, was 
wearing dark clothing and had a blood-alcohol level of 0.319% at the time 
of the accident.113  The evidence also suggested that the victim had 
wandered into Guzman’s lane of travel before Guzman struck him: The 
government’s own accident-reconstruction expert attributed the accident to 
“pedestrian error” and “agreed with Defendant that she was operating her 
vehicle in a safe manner” at the time of the accident.114  By way of contrary 
evidence, the appeals court cited only (1) evidence that “[t]here was no 
indication at the scene that Defendant took any evasive action prior to 
hitting the victim” and (2) a toxicologist’s testimony “that once a blood 
alcohol level exceeds .10, the individual’s field of vision narrows 
‘significantly’ and reaction time is slowed.”115 
The appeals court upheld Guzman’s conviction, however, specifically 
rejecting her claim that the government had failed to prove the “causal 
link” required under Munoz.116  Given the evidence in the case, even the 
bare fact that the court upheld Guzman’s conviction suggests that the court 
was doing something other than what Munoz required—something other 
than deciding whether the trial evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accident would not have occurred but for 
Guzman’s intoxication.  Even more telling, though, is the court’s almost 
exclusive reliance on the toxicologist’s testimony.  The toxicologist’s 
testimony shows only that Guzman’s intoxication increased whatever level 
                                                                                                                          
110 Id. at 145. 
111 Id. at 148.   
112 See id. at 148–49 (holding that the causal nexus requirement was satisfied by the government’s 
evidence “that if Defendant had not been intoxicated or driving recklessly, he would have applied his 
brakes or otherwise been able to avoid ramming the victim’s car”). 
113 Guzman, 96 P.3d at 1177. 
114 Id. at 1178.  Currently, the road where Guzman struck the victim, Elm Street, does not have a 
sidewalk.  But it does appear to have well-traveled dirt footpaths on either side, which are separated 
from the roadway by a curb.  See Google Streetview for 3rd St. & Elm St., Magdalena, NM, GOOGLE 
MAPS, http://maps.google.com (enter “3rd St. & Elm St., Magdalena, Soccorro, New Mexico 87825” 
into search and select “streetview”). 
115 Guzman, 96 P.3d at 1178.  
116 Id. (citing Munoz, 970 P.2d at 149). 
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of risk already was posed by her encounter with the victim on the night of 
the accident.117  The testimony does not show what base level of risk would 
have existed if Guzman had been sober when she encountered the victim.  
It does not tell us, then, whether a sober driver would have struck the 
victim.  In summary: The court, instead of requiring the government to 
prove that the accident would not have occurred but for Guzman’s 
intoxication, appears merely to have required the government to prove that 
the accident might not have occurred. 
The court in Guzman did not actually say this, of course—but other 
courts have.  Consider, once again, State v. Rumsey.118  Defendant Glenda 
Rumsey was charged with manslaughter after running over fourteen-year-
old bicyclist, Jose Rincon.119  Rumsey claimed that, given the defective 
design of the intersection where the accident occurred, even a sober driver 
might have struck Rincon.120  The appeals court appeared to accept—as 
had another Arizona appeals court—the proposition that the offense of 
vehicular homicide required the government to prove a causal nexus 
between the defendant’s intoxication and the accident.121  What the appeals 
court required by way of a causal nexus, however, was something less than 
a but-for connection.  The court did not require the government to prove 
that the accident would not have occurred but for Rumsey’s intoxication.  
Instead, it asked only whether Rumsey’s intoxication had “increased the 
risk that she might strike and seriously injure or kill someone in the bicycle 
lane of this allegedly dangerous intersection.”122   
The Minnesota courts appear to have settled on much the same 
approach.  The Minnesota courts, like the courts in Arizona and New 
Mexico, require proof of a causal nexus between the defendant’s 
intoxication and the fatal accident.123  In applying this requirement, 
                                                                                                                          
117 See Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 640–41 (Minn. 1980) (holding that a mere increase 
in risk of death or serious harm is insufficient to establish causation without testimony that death 
probably resulted from this increased risk); Sherer v. James, 351 S.E.2d 148, 150 (S.C. 1986) (holding 
that evidence of increased risk is insufficient to show causation). 
118 No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0041, 2010 WL 3410824 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2010). 
119 Id. at *1; Flick, supra note 1.   
120 Rumsey, 2010 WL 3410824, at *8. 
121 Id. at *8–9; see also State v. Fisher, No. 1 CA-CR 07-0310, 2008 WL 2447377, at *4 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. June 12, 2008) (tacitly accepting the legal premise of Fisher’s claim on appeal “that his 
intoxication played no role in causing L.W.’s death,” but rejecting Fisher’s claim on the facts because 
“based on the evidence, the jury reasonably could have found that Fisher failed to observe his 
surroundings and failed to avoid the collision because he was intoxicated”). 
122 Rumsey, 2010 WL 3410824, at *9; cf. Fisher, 2008 WL 2447377, at *4 (explaining that the 
“sudden emergency” doctrine is available to a drunk driver who strikes a pedestrian only if the driver 
did not “contribut[e] to the danger by his own conduct”). 
123 See, e.g., State v. Dunagan, No. C4-94-318, 1994 WL 246076, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 7, 
1994) (requiring the government to prove that a fatal “accident was caused by [the defendant’s] 
intoxication”), rev’d on other grounds, 521 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1994); see also State v. Holthaus, No. 
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however, the Minnesota courts have demanded something less than a but-
for causal connection between the defendant’s intoxication and the 
accident.  Consider, for example, State v. Holthaus,124 where the drunk 
driver, Holthaus, struck an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) and killed its 
passenger.125  Holthaus was convicted of vehicular manslaughter but 
argued on appeal that the government had failed to prove the required 
causal nexus between his intoxication and the fatal accident.126  He pointed 
out that the ATV was “traveling in the driving lane of a rural, dark road 
[and was] not legally equipped for highway travel” when Holthaus struck 
it.127  He also said that the headlights from an oncoming car had obscured 
his vision.128 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected Holthaus’s argument, 
concluding that his “intoxication and other conduct were substantial 
factors in causing the ATV passenger’s death.”129  This might sound like a 
resolution of the question whether Holthaus’s intoxication was a but-for 
cause of the passenger’s death, but it is not.  What Minnesota courts mean 
by the phrase “substantial factor”—or at any rate what they mean by this 
phrase in vehicular homicide cases—is essentially that the wrongful event 
or circumstance increased the risk to the victim.130  The question under 
Minnesota’s substantial-factor test, as the Minnesota Supreme Court held 
in State v. Southern, is whether the victim might have survived but for the 
wrongful event or circumstance, not whether the victim would have 
survived.131  Accordingly, what the Minnesota Court of Appeals meant 
when it said that Holthaus’s intoxication was a “substantial factor[] in 
causing the ATV passenger’s death” was only that Holthaus’s intoxication 
had reduced the ATV passenger’s chances of surviving their encounter on 
                                                                                                                          
C2-99-1793, 2000 WL 821607, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 27, 2000) (affirming the trial court’s 
analysis on whether the defendant’s conduct constituted a “substantial cause” of the victim’s death).  
124 2000 WL 821607. 
125 Id. at *1. 
126 Id. at *3.   
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. (emphasis added). 
130 State v. Southern, 304 N.W.2d 329, 330 (Minn. 1981); cf. State v. Baker, 720 So. 2d 767, 773 
(La. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining in a drunk-driving homicide appeal that “the defendant’s conduct need 
not be the sole proximate cause of the victim’s death; it is sufficient for the defendant’s acts to be a 
contributing cause or a substantial factor”). 
131 Southern, 304 N.W.2d at 330 (upholding a driver’s conviction for negligent vehicular 
homicide after concluding that the child victim “may well have survived” if the defendant had not 
driven off negligently and that the defendant’s negligent conduct “had the effect of ensuring the child’s 
death”); see also State v. Shane, No. A06-1581, 2008 WL 660543, at *4–5 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 
2008) (recognizing that the Minnesota Supreme Court in Southern rejected the driver’s argument that 
her gross negligence in leaving the scene was not proven to be “a substantial factor causing the child’s 
death”).   
 2013] WRONGFUL-ASPECT OVERDETERMINATION 627 
the night of the accident.132 
This is not to say, of course, that that appeals court in Holthaus 
required something less than a but-for causal connection between 
Holthaus’s wrongful conduct and the victim’s death.  Neither in Holthaus 
nor in Guzman or Rumsey was there any question as to whether the 
defendant’s operation of the motor vehicle was itself a but-for cause of the 
victim’s death.  It was only in connection with the question of wrongful-
aspect causation that the courts were reluctant to require the usual sort of 
causal connection—a but-for causal connection.  In summary, then, among 
courts that require a causal nexus between the defendant’s intoxication and 
the victim’s death, at least a few appear to be uncomfortable intuitively 
with what the usual but-for formulation of the wrongful-aspect test would 
require. 
VI.  THE CASES:  STATES THAT EXPLICITLY HAVE DECLINED TO  
REQUIRE A CAUSAL NEXUS 
Courts in nine states—Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Michigan, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin—have explicitly 
rejected the view that the government, in prosecutions for drunk-driving 
homicide, must prove that the defendant’s intoxication was a cause of the 
fatal crash.133  The Rhode Island Supreme Court, for example, has said that 
the state’s statute defining drunk-driving homicide “does not require the 
intoxication of the defendant to be a proximate cause of death.”134  The 
Colorado Supreme Court likewise has said that Colorado’s drunk-driving 
homicide statute “does not require evidence that the intoxication affected 
the driver’s operation in a manner that results in a collision.”135 
In reaching the conclusion that the defendant’s intoxication need not 
be a cause of the fatal collision, the courts have relied on varying 
rationales.  Some courts have assigned significance to the statutes’ 
wording.136  Others have relied, at least in part, on policy rationales, among 
them (1) the importance of deterring drunk-driving homicides and (2) the 
                                                                                                                          
132 Holthaus, 2000 WL 821607, at *9. 
133 See supra note 18. 
134 State v. Benoit, 650 A.2d 1230, 1233 (R.I. 1994).   
135 People v. Garner, 781 P.2d 87, 89 (Colo. 1989). 
136 Michigan’s statute, for example, provides: “A person . . . who operates a motor vehicle [while 
intoxicated] and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes the death of another person is guilty of a 
crime . . . .”  MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 257.625(4) (Supp. 2013) (emphasis added).  This language 
probably justifies the Michigan Supreme Court’s conclusion that the statute “requires the victim’s death 
to be caused by the defendant’s operation of the vehicle, rather than the defendant’s intoxicated 
manner of operation.”  People v. Schaefer, 703 N.W.2d 774, 784 (Mich. 2005).  More often, the courts 
have been confronted with ambiguous language.  See, e.g., Garner, 781 P.2d at 89 (interpreting COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 18-3-106(1)(b)(I) (1986), which provided: “If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of any drug or intoxicant and such conduct is the proximate cause of the 
death of another, he commits vehicular homicide.” (emphasis added)). 
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difficulty of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s 
intoxication was causally connected to the fatal accident.  The Florida 
Supreme Court, for example, said that imposing liability without proof of a 
causal nexus between the intoxication and the accident arguably “has the 
effect not only of inducing persons to engage in that activity with greater 
caution, but may also have the effect of keeping a relatively large class of 
persons from engaging in the conduct at all.”137  Other courts have 
emphasized that this deterrent objective might be undercut if the 
government were required to satisfy the “demanding” and “onerous” 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the collision would not 
have occurred if the defendant had been sober.138 
Despite having explicitly rejected the scope-of-the-risk limitation, 
however, and despite having provided solid reasons for this rejection, the 
courts simultaneously have expressed reservations about imposing liability 
in just those cases where, as it happens, the scope-of-the-risk limitation is 
not satisfied.  Usually the courts have relied on hypothetical cases in 
articulating these concerns.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court, for 
example, said it would be “absurd” to impose liability “if a person were 
driving while legally intoxicated and an airplane suddenly plunged from 
the sky into the driver’s motor vehicle, killing the pilot.”139  Likewise, the 
Florida Supreme Court said that the state legislature could not have meant 
to impose liability in a case where, say, “[a]n intoxicated person drives an 
automobile to an intersection and properly stops at a stop light” and while 
he is “there in a stationary position, the vehicle is struck from behind” by a 
negligent driver, who “dies from injuries received in the collision.”140  The 
Indiana Supreme Court used a somewhat less fanciful example to articulate 
the same basic concern: “[A] drunk driver who hits a child who has run out 
from behind two parked cars,” the court said, is “entitled to ask a jury to 
find him not guilty because there is [a] reasonable doubt whether he caused 
                                                                                                                          
137 Baker v. State, 377 So. 2d 17, 19–20 (Fla. 1979). 
138 See People v. Lardie, 551 N.W.2d 656, 674–75 & n.13 (Mich. 1996) (Weaver, J., concurring) 
(describing the burden imposed on the government by the majority’s ruling as “demanding” and 
“onerous”), overruled by Schaefer, 703 N.W.2d 774; see also Micinski v. State, 487 N.E.2d 150, 154 
(Ind. 1986) (“Analysis [under] this statute should focus on the driver’s acts and not on speculation 
about whether he could have stopped if he had been sober.”); State v. Adams, 810 N.W.2d 365, 378 
(Iowa 2012) (Waterman, J., concurring) (explaining that the Iowa legislature’s decision to “stop[] short 
of requiring proof that alcohol intoxication . . . actually caused the fatal accident” was driven in part by 
“the difficulties of proof separating intoxication from driving”); State v. Resler, 55 N.W.2d 35, 38 
(Wis. 1952) (“[T]o require that facts be shown to prove that defendant’s operation of the car was so 
affected by his intoxication that the accident would not have happened if he had been sober, would be 
to impose an impossible burden upon the State in the prosecution of such a case.”). 
139 State v. Benoit, 650 A.2d 1230, 1233 (R.I. 1994).  Interestingly, the court in Benoit also said 
that “if a person suffered a sudden heart attack while driving in a legally intoxicated state which 
resulted in a fatal collision, the operator would be criminally liable.”  Id. 
140 Magaw v. State, 537 So. 2d 564, 567 (Fla. 1989).  
 2013] WRONGFUL-ASPECT OVERDETERMINATION 629 
the collision.”141 
To accommodate cases like these, the courts—though still insisting 
that the law requires no causal connection between the intoxication and the 
accident—have adopted other, less well-defined causal limitations to 
supplement the standard requirements of but-for and proximate causation.  
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, for example, has said that the 
government, in addition to proving that the defendant’s driving was a but-
for cause of the fatal accident, also must prove “that the defendant’s 
manner of operating his or her motor vehicle was a proximate cause of the 
injury in question.”142  Likewise, the Iowa Supreme Court, despite insisting 
that the state’s drunk-driving homicide statute “does not impose a burden 
on the State to prove a specific causal connection between the defendant’s 
intoxication and the victim’s death,”143 has said nevertheless that “the 
statute demands more than mere proof that the defendant’s driving caused 
the death of another person.”144  What “more” the statute demands, though, 
is unclear.  The Iowa Supreme Court has said by way of clarification only 
that “a defendant may be found guilty of homicide by vehicle only if the 
jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that his criminal act of driving [while 
intoxicated] caused the victim’s death.”145 
One way of giving content to this mysterious additional requirement 
would be to interpret it as a requirement that the defendant drive 
negligently—that the manner in which he operates his car qualify as a 
deviation from what a reasonable driver would have done under the 
circumstances.146  But the courts have rejected this interpretation of their 
decisions.  The Florida Supreme Court, for example, has insisted that 
Florida’s drunk-driving homicide statute—though it requires more than a 
but-for causal connection between the defendant’s driving and the 
accident—“does not require proof of the separate and independent element 
of ‘simple negligence.’”147  Likewise, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
insisted that the state’s drunk-driving homicide statute does not require the 
state to prove that the defendant’s manner of driving “rose to the level of 
criminal negligence or recklessness.”148  It would be difficult for the courts 
to conclude otherwise, moreover, since most states’ drunk-driving 
homicide statutes clearly are designed to dispense with any requirement 
                                                                                                                          
141 Micinski, 487 N.E.2d at 154. 
142 Benoit, 650 A.2d at 1234 (emphasis added). 
143 Adams, 810 N.W.2d at 371 (majority opinion). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 State v. Van Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 558 (Fla. 1999) (acknowledging that the court’s earlier 
decisions on the subject of causation in drunk-driving homicide had been “interpreted as reading a 
required simple negligence element into the statute”).  
147 Id. at 564. 
148 State v. Benoit, 650 A.2d 1230, 1234 (R.I. 1994). 
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that the government prove recklessness or negligence; most states’ drunk-
driving homicide statutes treat drunk driving as a kind of criminal 
negligence per se.149 
The only apparent alternative is to interpret the decisions as requiring 
some sort of “misoperation” short of negligence.150  A misoperation 
requirement works well enough if we confine our consideration to cases 
where, say, a driver crosses the road’s center line and strikes an oncoming 
car.  But if we expand our focus to the kinds of drunk-driving cases where 
causation really is at issue, it becomes apparent that the misoperation 
requirement lacks substance.  Take, for example, State v. Guzman, where 
the driver struck a pedestrian who apparently was walking in the driver’s 
lane of travel.151  Or take State v. Holthaus, where the driver struck an 
ATV that was “traveling in the driving lane of a rural, dark road.”152  In 
cases like these—where the driver does not, say, deviate from his lane or 
run a red light—the question whether the driver’s “manner of driving” 
qualified as “misoperation” could only be addressed by measuring the 
defendant’s conduct against a hypothetical sober driver’s.  But measuring 
the defendant’s conduct against a sober driver’s is exactly what these 
courts have declined to do.  They have explicitly declined to require the 
government to prove a causal connection between the defendant’s 
intoxication and the fatal accident. 
VII.  THE SEARCH FOR MIDDLE GROUND 
In what they say—as distinct from what they do—the courts in drunk-
driving homicide cases appear to be starkly divided.  Some courts say that 
the law requires the government to prove a causal nexus between the 
defendant’s intoxication and the fatal accident; others say that it does not.  
On neither side of this divide, though, do the courts seem comfortable with 
the consequences of the positions they have staked out.  Among courts that 
purport to require proof of a causal nexus, this discomfort is reflected in 
the courts’ seeming reluctance to require the government to prove genuine 
but-for causation.  Among courts that purport not to require proof of a 
causal nexus, the courts’ discomfort is reflected in their adoption of a 
                                                                                                                          
149 See Eric A. Johnson, Mens Rea for Sexual Abuse: The Case for Defining the Acceptable Risk, 
99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 11–20 (2009) (explaining how general intent offenses, such as drunk 
driving, are treated as negligence per se); see also Van Hubbard, 751 So. 2d at 561 (“It is negligence 
per se to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants.”); State v. Caibaiosai, 363 
N.W.2d 574, 577 (Wis. 1985) (“The commission of the offense [operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of an intoxicant resulting in death] does not require any erratic or negligent driving.”). 
150 Van Hubbard, 751 So. 2d at 563. 
151 See State v. Guzman, 96 P.3d 1173, 1178 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (acknowledging that “the 
State’s accident reconstruction expert assigned the cause of the accident to ‘pedestrian error’ and . . . 
agreed with Defendant that she was operating her vehicle in a safe manner”). 
152 No. C2-99-1793, 2000 WL 821607, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 27, 2000). 
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mysterious requirement that the fatal accident be attributable to the 
defendant’s “manner of driving” or “misoperation.”  The courts on both 
sides of the causal-nexus question appear to be searching for middle 
ground. 
It is tempting to suppose that the courts’ discomfort in these cases 
merely is a reflection of the practical difficulties associated with 
determining in any particular case whether the fatal accident was 
attributable to the defendant’s intoxication.153  In other words, it is 
tempting to suppose both (1) that the courts on both sides of the causal-
nexus question recognize intuitively that liability for homicide ought to 
depend on whether the victim’s death resulted from the risk that made the 
defendant’s conduct wrong; and (2) at the same time, that courts on both 
sides recognize the government cannot realistically be expected to shoulder 
the “impossible,”154 or at least “onerous,”155 burden of showing definitively 
that the fatal accident would not have occurred but for the driver’s 
intoxication. 
This view of the problem as essentially practical or evidentiary finds 
support in tort cases, where courts have said that the practical difficulty of 
proving wrongful-aspect causation sometimes will justify shifting or 
moderating the plaintiff’s burden of proof.  This approach is best illustrated 
by Judge Calabresi’s opinion for the Second Circuit in Zuchowicz v. United 
States.156  Writing for the court, Judge Calabresi acknowledged that 
plaintiffs often face insurmountable difficulties in affirmatively “linking 
defendant’s negligence to the harm,” even in cases where the defendant’s 
negligent conduct—as opposed to his conduct’s negligent aspect—“was 
undoubtedly a but for cause of the harm.”157  In response to this difficulty, 
he said that a plaintiff satisfies his burden of proving wrongful-aspect 
causation if he shows both (1) that the defendant’s negligence “increased 
the chances that a particular type of accident would occur,” and (2) that “a 
mishap of that very sort did happen.”158 
Judge Calabresi did not mean by this remark that increased risk is 
legally sufficient; that increased risk is all the law requires by way of a 
causal nexus between the wrongful aspect of the defendant’s conduct and 
                                                                                                                          
153 State v. Resler, 55 N.W.2d 35, 38 (Wis. 1952) (“[T]o require that facts be shown to prove that 
defendant’s operation of the car was so affected by his intoxication that the accident would not have 
happened if he had been sober, would be to impose an impossible burden upon the State in the 
prosecution of such a case.”). 
154 Id. 
155 People v. Lardie, 551 N.W.2d 656, 675 n.13 (Mich. 1996) (Weaver, J., concurring) (describing 
the burden imposed on the government by the majority’s ruling as difficult and “onerous”), overruled 
by People v. Schaefer, 703 N.W.2d 774 (Mich. 2005). 
156 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998). 
157 Id. at 390. 
158 Id. 
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the plaintiff’s harm.  He meant, rather, that evidence of increased risk, 
taken together with evidence that “a mishap of [the threatened] sort did 
happen,” is sufficient as an evidentiary matter to satisfy the plaintiff’s 
burden of proof.159  Once the plaintiff has made this required prima facie 
showing, Judge Calabresi said, “it is up to the negligent party to bring in 
evidence” that disproves the existence of a “but-for” causation connection 
between the conduct’s wrongful aspect and the victim’s harm.160  For 
Judge Calabresi, then, the legal question facing the fact finder in 
Zuchowicz still was whether the wrongful aspect was a but-for cause of the 
victim’s harm.161 
One state legislature, Wisconsin’s, has adopted a Zuchowicz-like 
burden-shifting approach to the drunk-driving homicide cases.  
Wisconsin’s drunk-driving homicide statute “does not include as an 
element of the crime a direct causal connection between the fact of 
defendant’s intoxication . . . and the victim’s death.”162  But the statute 
does create an affirmative defense on this subject.163  The statute provides 
that “the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the death would have occurred even if he or she had been 
exercising due care and he or she had not been under the influence of an 
intoxicant.”164  This provision, like Judge Calabresi’s ruling in Zuchowicz, 
does not change the substantive legal question put to the fact finder; the 
question remains whether the defendant’s intoxication was a but-for cause 
of the defendant’s conduct.  The effect of the provision merely is to shift 
the burden of persuasion on this “but for” question to the defendant.165 
Though plausible, the diagnosis implied by this burden-shifting rule 
seems inconsistent with what the courts actually have said in the drunk-
driving homicide cases.  The burden-shifting rule implies, of course, that 
the shortcomings of the aspect-based but-for test in this context are 
procedural or evidentiary rather than substantive.  But the courts’ decisions 
                                                                                                                          
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 390–91. 
161 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 28 reporters’ note cmt. b (2010) (treating Zuchowicz and like cases as addressing the burden-
of-proof question).  
162 State v. Caibaiosai, 363 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Wis. 1985). 
163 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.09(2)(a) (West 2005). 
164 Id. 
165 Id.; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.12 (McKinney 2009) (creating a permissive presumption 
that the driver’s intoxication caused the death: “If it is established that the person operating such motor 
vehicle, vessel, public vessel, snowmobile or all terrain vehicle caused such death while unlawfully 
intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol or a drug, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption 
that, as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined 
influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, such person operated the motor vehicle, vessel, 
public vessel, snowmobile or all terrain vehicle in a manner that caused such death, as required by this 
section”). 
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in the drunk-driving homicide cases seem to betray discomfort not merely 
with this but-for test’s evidentiary demands but with the test itself.  In 
Rumsey, for example, the court appeared to treat the “increased risk” 
created by Rumsey’s intoxication as legally sufficient to satisfy the causal 
nexus requirement.166  It was determinative, the court said, that Rumsey’s 
intoxication had “increased the risk that she might strike and seriously 
injure or kill someone in the bicycle lane of this allegedly dangerous 
intersection.”167  Likewise, in Holthaus, the court’s use of the phrase 
“substantial factors” suggested that something short of a but-for 
relationship between the defendant’s intoxication and the fatal accident 
might suffice legally to satisfy the scope-of-the-risk requirement.168 
More importantly, though, the substantive law of causation points to a 
clear, if not easy, alternative explanation for the courts’ intuitive 
discomfort with the demands of the but-for test in these cases.  The drunk-
driving homicide cases are so-called “causal-overdetermination” cases.169 
VIII.  INTOXICATION AS CAUSAL OVERDETERMINATION 
In “the great mass of cases,” the but-for test produces the right answer 
to the question whether a defendant’s conduct is a factual cause of the 
harm.170  Everyone agrees, however, that in some cases the but-for test 
does not capture our shared intuitions about factual causation.171  The 
easiest of these are cases where “two causes concur to bring about an 
event, and either one of them, operating alone, would have been sufficient 
to cause the identical result.”172  Suppose, for example, that “two assailants 
without preconcert attack their victim with intent to kill, and death results 
because each has simultaneously struck a mortal blow.”173  In this case, 
either of the two assaults would have been sufficient to bring about the 
result, and so neither really is necessary.  Neither assault is a but-for cause, 
in other words.  Tort and criminal scholars alike have long recognized, 
however, that in cases like these “there are good reasons both for saying 
that some given event was caused by some action and also that it would 
                                                                                                                          
166 State v. Rumsey, No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0041, 2010 WL 3410824, at *9 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 
2010). 
167 Id.  
168 State v. Holthaus, No. C2-99-1793, 2000 WL 821607, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 27, 2000). 
169 See Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 207 F.3d 1177, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2000) (using and 
explaining the phrase “causal overdetermination”). 
170 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 409 (2000).   
171 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 2 (1985) (“All who have considered the issue agree that 
each of the assailants [in the standard two-actor overdetermination scenario] should be liable . . . .”). 
172 KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 41; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 2.    
173 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 2.   
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have happened without this action.”174 
This so-called “causal-overdetermination” problem cannot be confined 
to cases where the actor’s conduct was independently sufficient to cause 
the harm.  Suppose, for example, that three different actors independently 
administer equal doses of the same poison to their intended victim, and that 
any two of the three equal doses would have sufficed to bring about the 
victim’s death.  In this case, none of the three actors’ contributions was 
necessary to bring about the victim’s death, since any two of the 
contributions would have sufficed.  But neither was any of the three actor’s 
contributions independently sufficient to bring about the victim’s death, 
since a single dose would not have caused the victim’s death.  Still, nearly 
everyone would regard each of these actors as responsible for the victim’s 
death.175  Widely shared intuitions tell us that “such positive, albeit 
unnecessary, contributions to the relevant mechanism by which 
an . . . injury occurred should be identified by our law as factual 
‘causes.’”176 
These intuitions are reflected, for example, in Prosser’s test for cases 
of multiple causation, namely:  
When the conduct of two or more actors is so related to an 
event that their combined conduct, viewed as a whole, is a 
but-for cause of the event, and application of the but-for rule 
to them individually would absolve all of them, the conduct 
of each is a cause in fact of the event.177   
The same basic intuitions also are reflected in the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts, which provides that, in cases of multiple causation, an actor’s 
conduct will count as a cause of the harm if it is possible, by 
counterfactually subtracting some “other act(s),” to construct a world in 
which the actor’s conduct is a necessary element of a sufficient causal 
set.178  In our poisoning hypothetical, for example, the Restatement would 
permit the fact finder to subtract counterfactually the conduct of one of the 
                                                                                                                          
174 HART & HONORÉ, supra note 29, at 123; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 2 
(discussing the issue of separate actions that simultaneously act as but-for causes). 
175 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 
cmt. f (2010) (“The fact that an actor’s conduct requires other conduct to be sufficient to cause 
another’s harm does not obviate the applicability of [the rule governing multiple sufficient causes].”); 
Jane Stapleton, Unnecessary Causes, 129 L.Q. REV. 39, 60 (2013) (“There is no reason to think courts 
would take a different view in cases where the defendant’s tortious contribution was not only 
unnecessary for the threshold to have been reached but was also insufficient for it to be reached.”). 
176 Stapleton, supra note 175, at 45.  
177 KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 41; see also DOBBS, supra note 170, at 417 (describing a 
popular “variation on the but-for rule” in which “the conduct of all defendants as a group is aggregated 
and considered as a whole . . . . [and the] but-for test is then applied to their conduct taken as a unit or 
set”). 
178 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27. 
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three poisoners, thus making the conduct of each poisoner a necessary 
element of a sufficient causal set consisting of just two doses of poison. 
Though questions of causal overdetermination arise less frequently (or 
at least receive less attention) in criminal law than in tort, courts and 
scholars have recognized that the same rules apply.179  Probably the most 
influential effort to formulate these rules for criminal cases occurred in 
connection with the Brown Commission’s 1971 report on a proposed 
federal criminal code revision.180  Under the proposed code section, as 
under Prosser’s test, a defendant’s conduct counts as a factual cause of a 
proscribed result if it contributes to a causal mechanism that, in the 
aggregate, is a but-for cause of the result.181  In the words of the revised 
code: “Causation may be found where the result would not have occurred 
but for the conduct of the accused operating either alone or concurrently 
with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to 
produce the result and the conduct of the accused clearly insufficient.”182  
Neither this nor any other federal definition of causation ever was adopted 
by Congress.  (Congress apparently decided, as most state legislatures have 
done, to leave the development of causation doctrine to the courts.183)  But 
legislatures in several states—Alabama, Arkansas, Maine, North Dakota, 
and Texas—later adopted state code provisions that were identical or 
nearly identical to the draft federal provision.184 
The differences among the various tests are less important, for our 
purposes, than what they have in common.  What they have in common is 
that each permits the fact finder to “combine” the actor’s conduct with 
some other causal factor or factors and then to assign liability on the basis 
of the causal role played, in the aggregate, by the entire causal mechanism.  
Notice, however, that this approach to causal overdetermination is subject 
to an unspoken limitation.  Only when the actor’s conduct bears a 
complementary relationship to the other causal factor is it permissible to 
                                                                                                                          
179 See United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 98 (1st Cir. 2012) (invoking the tests for causal 
overdetermination from both Prosser and the Restatement in resolving the question of whether the 
defendant’s distribution and possession of child pornography were a cause of the victim’s harm); FINAL 
NAT’L COMM’N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 23, at 31–32 (proposing a test for 
cases of concurrent causation that roughly tracks Prosser’s test).   
180 See NAT’L COMM’N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 23, at xi–xiv 
(describing the basic features of the proposed Code).   
181 Id. at 31–32.  
182 Id. (emphasis added). 
183 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 5 (1985) (observing that “[i]n the majority of 
jurisdictions that have adopted or considered revised codes, no explicit provision on causation has been 
included”).  A few jurisdictions have adopted general causation provisions based on Model Penal Code 
§ 2.03.  See supra note 28 (listing a few such states). 
184 ALA. CODE § 13A-2-5(a) (LexisNexis 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-205 (LexisNexis 2006); 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17A, § 33 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-05 (2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 6.04 (West 2011). 
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“combine” them.185   
To illustrate, suppose that two archers, each with a single arrow, fire 
independently at an unknowing victim, and that one of the two arrows—no 
one knows whose—strikes the victim.  In this hypothetical case, no one 
would argue that the conduct of the two archers could be combined or 
aggregated, for neither archer contributed to the likelihood that the other’s 
arrow would strike the victim; neither archer complemented the danger 
posed by the other.186  In the poisoning hypothetical, by contrast, the 
actions of the three poisoners are complementary: each poisoner’s conduct 
enhances the risk posed by the others’ conduct; and each contributes to a 
“causal set” that, in the aggregate, clearly is sufficient to bring about the 
victim’s injury.187 
Just the required sort of complementary relationship appears to be 
present in the drunk-driving homicide cases.  Once again, consider the 
Rumsey case.188  At her trial for manslaughter, Rumsey claimed that the 
fatal accident was attributable not to her gross intoxication but to the 
defective design of the intersection where the accident occurred.189  She 
claimed, specifically, that the intersection’s design—the fact that “the 
width of the lane on one side of the intersection is narrower than on the 
other”—would have made it difficult for even a sober driver to notice and 
then avoid cyclists traveling on the side of the roadway.190  But Rumsey’s 
gross intoxication plainly would have complemented whatever danger was 
created by the roadway’s design.  After all, any danger posed by the 
intersection would have inhered in the intersection’s demands on drivers’ 
abilities to perceive and react.  And in Rumsey’s case, these very abilities 
were badly impaired by her intoxication.  Rumsey’s intoxication did not 
just increase the likelihood that a fatal accident would occur.  As the court 
said, it “increased the likelihood that any defect in the design of the 
roadway would result in a serious accident.”191  It complemented the 
danger posed by the very defect to which Rumsey attributed the accident. 
The Guzman case illustrates the same point.192  At her trial for 
vehicular homicide, Guzman claimed that the fatal accident was 
                                                                                                                          
185 See Eric A. Johnson, Criminal Liability for Loss of a Chance, 91 IOWA L. Rev. 59, 101, 104 
(2005) (arguing that the “complementary relationship [among the causal factors] serves as the pivot of 
the rule of multiple sufficient causal sets”).  
186 Id. at 77–78; see also Stapleton, supra note 175, at 40 (“[W]here in breach of duty A and B 
carelessly shoot towards a person who is hit by only one bullet, we know that A’s breach would either 
have made a positive and necessary contribution to the occurrence of the injury (i.e. it was A’s bullet 
that hit), or it would have been completely uninvolved.”). 
187 Johnson, supra note 185, at 96. 
188 State v. Rumsey, No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0041, 2010 WL 3410824 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2010). 
189 Id. at *8. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at *9. 
192 State v. Guzman, 96 P.3d 1173 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). 
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attributable not to her intoxication but to the fact that the victim, a 
pedestrian who “was wearing dark clothing and had a blood alcohol 
content of .319,” had wandered into her lane of travel.193  She claimed that 
she “could only reasonably be expected to evade a pedestrian who was 
visible to her; [the victim’s] dark clothing and doubtlessly erratic 
movements would have precluded this.”194  But Guzman’s intoxication 
would have complemented whatever danger was posed by the victim’s 
dark clothing and erratic movements.  A toxicologist testified at Guzman’s 
trial that “once a blood alcohol level exceeds .10, the individual’s field of 
vision narrows ‘significantly’ and reaction time is slowed.”195  Thus, 
Guzman’s impairment would only have made it harder for her to see the 
victim in his dark clothing and would only have made it harder for her to 
react to his erratic movements.  Guzman’s intoxication did not just increase 
the likelihood that an accident would occur, then.  It complemented the 
very factors to which Guzman attributed the accident. 
Not only do the Rumsey and Guzman cases satisfy this basic 
contribution requirement; they also satisfy an additional limitation imposed 
by the Brown Commission’s variation on the Prosser test.  Under the 
Brown Commission test, even conduct that contributes to the operative 
causal mechanism will fail to qualify as a cause if the other contributions 
to the causal mechanism were “clearly sufficient to produce the result.”196  
In other words, the Brown Commission test is satisfied only if the 
defendant’s contribution might have made a difference.  This requirement 
is easily satisfied in cases like Rumsey and Guzman.  Neither the defective 
intersection in Rumsey nor the erratic movements and dark clothing of the 
victim in Guzman made the fatal accident inevitable.197  Neither factor, 
then, was “clearly sufficient to produce” the accident.198 
Causal overdetermination appears, then, to account for the intuitions at 
work in the drunk-driving homicide cases.  It appears to explain, first, why 
the courts in these cases intuitively have required something less than a 
but-for causal connection between the defendant’s intoxication and the 
fatal accident.  In most drunk-driving homicide cases, as in Guzman and 
Rumsey, the causal mechanism behind the fatal accident is the interplay of 
roadway hazards with limitations on the driver’s ability to perceive and 
                                                                                                                          
193 Id. at 1177–78. 
194 Id. at 1178. 
195 Id.  
196 NAT’L COMM’N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 23, at 32. 
197 The court in Rumsey implied as much when it said that Rumsey’s intoxication had “increased 
the likelihood that any defect in the design of the roadway would result in a serious accident.”  State v. 
Rumsey, No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0041, 2010 WL 3410824, at *9 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2010).  If the 
intersection’s design defect had made an accident inevitable, then Rumsey’s intoxication could not 
have increased the likelihood of an accident. 
198 NAT’L COMM’N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 23, at 32. 
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react.199  The driver’s intoxication usually will contribute to this causal 
mechanism by exacerbating existing limitations on the driver’s ability to 
perceive and react.  What is more, this contribution nearly always will be 
potentially decisive; the roadway hazards almost never will make the 
accident inevitable.  This sort of incremental contribution is enough, 
according to the standard accounts of causal overdetermination.  On these 
accounts, the law requires at most that the defendant’s conduct—or the 
wrongful-aspect of the defendant’s conduct—make a potentially decisive 
contribution to the mechanism underlying the victim’s injury.  It does not 
require in addition that the defendant’s contribution qualify as a but-for 
cause of the injury.200 
The causal-overdetermination rules not only explain the cases where 
the courts have imposed liability for drunk-driving homicide; they also 
explain the courts’ avowed reluctance to impose liability in, say, the red 
light hypothetical, or the malfunctioning airplane hypothetical.201  What 
these two hypotheticals have in common is that in neither case is the 
accident attributable to the interplay of roadway hazards with the driver’s 
ability to perceive and react.  Drivers cannot be expected to react to 
airplanes plunging steeply from the sky, nor can they be expected to evade 
cars approaching from behind at stoplights.  Under these circumstances, 
there simply is no room for intoxication to affect the course of events.  And 
so the driver’s intoxication cannot be said to have made a potentially 
decisive contribution to the causal mechanism behind the fatal accident. 
IX.  THE LOST-CHANCE CASES 
The courts in the drunk-driving homicide cases have not mentioned 
causal overdetermination, of course.  But there are good reasons for 
thinking that the courts’ struggles with the causal-nexus question in these 
cases are traceable to their intuitions about causal overdetermination rather 
than, say, to the procedural difficulties associated with proof of causation 
in this setting.  Among these reasons is the fact that the same intuitions 
appear to have made themselves felt in other sorts of homicide cases—
                                                                                                                          
199 See Rumsey, 2010 WL 3410824, at *9 (discussing the increased risk that defendant might 
injure someone in the bicycle lane because of her intoxication); Guzman, 96 P.3d at 1178 (summarizing 
toxicologist testimony that “once a blood alcohol level exceeds .10, the individual’s field of vision 
narrows ‘significantly’ and reaction time is slowed”). 
200 See Johnson, supra note 185, at 61 (noting the emergence of cases which “do not satisfy the 
criminal law’s traditional requirement of ‘but-for’ causation”). 
201 See Magaw v. State, 537 So. 2d 564, 567 (Fla. 1989) (narrating a hypothetical accident where 
a drunk driver is struck from behind while stopped at a red light); State v. Benoit, 650 A.2d 1230, 1233 
(R.I. 1994) (describing a similar no-fault situation in which a drunk driver is struck by a crashing plane 
and the pilot is killed). 
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many far removed factually from drunk-driving homicide.202  In these other 
cases, as in drunk-driving homicide, courts have struggled to articulate the 
intuitions underlying their causation rulings.203  And in these other cases, 
as in the drunk-driving homicide cases, the courts’ rulings are explained by 
the standard account of causal overdetermination.204 
Consider, for example, State v. Montoya.205  Adam Montoya was 
charged with murder for his role in the death of Ty Lowery.206  Lowery 
died from a gunshot wound, but Montoya himself didn’t shoot Lowery, nor 
was he implicated in the shooting as an accomplice.207  Rather, shortly after 
the shooting, Montoya kidnapped the injured Lowery and drove him to a 
nearby river, where he left him to die.208  At Montoya’s trial, the state’s 
pathologist could not testify that Montoya’s actions were a but-for cause of 
Lowery’s death.209  He acknowledged that “he thought it was still more 
than likely that the victim would have died even if he would have been 
taken to the hospital.”210  But the pathologist testified “there was ‘some 
chance’ that immediate medical attention could have prevented the 
victim’s death.”211  In upholding Montoya’s conviction, the court said it 
was enough that Montoya had deprived Lowery of this “chance” of 
survival: “This evidence permits a finding that the victim was not put on an 
unalterable course of death once he had been shot.  Immediate medical 
intervention could possibly have saved his life.”212 
Or consider Armstrong v. State,213 where Polee Armstrong was charged 
with manslaughter on the basis of evidence that he had severely beaten his 
wife, Corrine, on the night of her death.214  The cause of Corrine’s death 
“was asphyxiation resulting from the blockage of [her] wind passage by a 
dense and viscus [sic] mucous clot located at the vocal cords in the 
                                                                                                                          
202 See Johnson, supra note 185, at 61–65 (analyzing homicide cases in which the defendants’ 
conduct “merely reduced the victim’s chances of surviving”). 
203 See id. at 64 (“[C]ourts widely scattered around the country have arrived at eerily similar 
results without . . . any rationale to guide them.  The cases reflect only a remarkable uniformity of 
intuition.”). 
204 See id. at 106 (arguing that “cases that satisfy the lost-chance doctrine also will satisfy the rule 
of multiple sufficient causal sets if we properly define lost chance”).  
205 61 P.3d 793 (N.M. 2002). 
206 Id. at 795. 
207 Id. at 796. 
208 Id. 
209 See id. (recounting testimony from the pathologist who performed the autopsy on the victim, 
saying that there was “some chance” the victim’s death could have been prevented, though it was 
“more than likely that the victim would have died” regardless of the defendant’s actions). 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 801. 
213 502 P.2d 440 (Alaska 1972). 
214 Id. at 442–43. 
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larynx.”215  According to the pathologist, “such a mucous clot ordinarily 
would have been expectorated automatically by an innate coughing 
reflex.”216  In Corrine’s case, however, “unconsciousness inhibited that 
innate reflex, and asphyxiation resulted.”217  What made the question of 
causation problematic was the presence of “[t]wo possible causes of the 
reflex-inhibiting unconsciousness . . . : excessive alcohol consumption and 
blows to the head”218 administered by Armstrong.  Because Corrine had an 
extraordinarily high blood-alcohol level at the time of her death, the 
pathologist was unable to say that she would have survived but for the 
blows administered by Armstrong.  He could say only that she “might have 
survived” but for the beating.219  Nevertheless, the appeals court held that 
his testimony was sufficient to prove causation. 
Decisions like Montoya and Armstrong obviously cannot be explained 
by the but-for test of causation.  In cases like these, the government’s 
evidence at best shows that, but for the defendant’s wrongdoing, the victim 
might have survived the injury or illness that killed her.  The evidence does 
not show that she would have survived, and so it does not satisfy the but-
for test. 
The evidence in these cases does satisfy the standard tests of causal 
overdetermination, however.  For example, in Armstrong the beating 
administered by the defendant contributed, along with the victim’s 
intoxication, to the victim’s deep unconsciousness, which in turn inhibited 
her ability to expel the mucous clot stuck in her windpipe.220  Because the 
beating made a positive contribution to a causal mechanism that brought 
about the victim’s death—namely, her deep unconsciousness—the beating 
counts as a factual cause, quite apart from whether it was necessary; quite 
apart, that is, from whether the victim’s intoxication might by itself have 
sufficed to cause the requisite degree of unconsciousness.221  The same is 
true of the defendant’s conduct in Montoya.222  In Montoya, the 
defendant’s kidnapping of the victim complemented the victim’s gunshot 
wound by depriving the victim of medical care that would have stopped the 
                                                                                                                          
215 Id. at 444. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 See id. at 444 n.5 (recounting expert testimony regarding the victim’s injury). 
221 See Johnson, supra note 185, at 76–81, 97–98 (analyzing Armstrong); see also Stapleton, 
supra note 175, at 50 (analyzing a similar case, where the victim’s fatal inhalation of vomit was 
attributable to her physically weakened state, which in turn was attributable both to her underlying 
pancreatitis and to the defendant’s tortious conduct). 
222 State v. Montoya, 61 P.3d 793 (N.M. 2002). 
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bleeding.223  Because the kidnapping of the victim made a positive 
contribution to the causal mechanism that brought about the victim’s 
death—namely, blood loss—it qualifies as a factual cause quite apart from 
whether the victim might have died anyway. 
Armstrong and Montoya are representative of a very large class of 
cases.224  Yet the courts in these cases, like the courts in the drunk-driving 
homicide cases, have struggled to articulate the intuitions underlying their 
decisions.  Some, including the Montoya and Armstrong courts, insisted 
that they merely were applying the but-for test as they always had.225  None 
of them explicitly has invoked principles of causal overdetermination.  
What they have said to justify their conclusions, when they have said 
anything at all, is that the defendant’s conduct deprived the victim of a 
“chance of survival.”226 
This “lost-chance” formula is, as it happens, identical in substance to 
the Brown Commission test for causal overdetermination.  First, like the 
Brown Commission test, it requires the government to prove that the 
actor’s conduct contributed to or complemented a causal mechanism that, 
in the aggregate, was responsible for bringing about the proscribed result.  
In ordinary usage, after all, a defendant’s conduct would not be said to 
have deprived the victim of a “chance” of surviving another illness or 
injury unless it either (1) had itself caused the victim’s death; or (2) had 
complemented the other illness or injury.227   
Second, like the Brown Commission test, the lost-chance test requires 
                                                                                                                          
223 Id. at 796–97; see also Johnson, supra note 185, at 78 (noting that in Montoya the “defendant’s 
conduct had actually complemented some other non-background causal factor, not merely that the 
defendant’s conduct might have complemented the other causal factor”). 
224 See Johnson, supra note 185, at 61 n.3 (listing lost-chance cases decided prior to 2005); see 
also People v. Bonilla, No. B232473, 2012 WL 3538731, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2012) 
(upholding doctor’s manslaughter conviction on the basis of evidence that the victim “would have had 
a better than 50 percent chance of survival” if the doctor promptly had initiated resuscitation efforts 
after the victim exhibited a toxic reaction to lidocaine anesthetic); Grayer v. State, 647 S.E.2d 264, 268 
(Ga. 2007) (upholding defendant’s conviction for murder after concluding that but for the defendant’s 
failure to seek medical care for the infant victim, “the baby might have survived”); People v. Hoerer, 
872 N.E.2d 572, 574, 579 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (upholding defendant’s conviction for involuntary 
manslaughter after concluding that but for the defendant’s efforts to prevent his friends from 
summoning assistance for the victim, the victim “might have survived” the methadone overdose that 
killed her); State v. Shane, No. A06-1581, 2008 WL 660543, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 2008) 
(upholding a defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder after concluding that the defendant’s 
failure to seek prompt medical assistance for her infant daughter had deprived the daughter of “between 
a two and ten percent chance of survival”). 
225 See Armstrong v. State, 502 P.2d 440, 446 n.12 (Alaska 1972) (upholding the “proper” jury 
instruction on causal connection); Montoya, 61 P.3d at 798 (confirming the jury instruction on the 
correct legal standard as to causation); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616, 626 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1985) (“The charge, though strongly worded, stated the law in the Commonwealth today.”). 
226 Shane, 2008 WL 660543, at *3; Montoya, 61 P.3d at 796; People v. Knapp, 495 N.Y.S.2d 985, 
993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). 
227 Johnson, supra note 185, at 77–78. 
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that the defendant’s contribution to this causal mechanism be potentially 
decisive.  A defendant’s contribution would not be said to have deprived 
the victim of a chance of survival if the other contributions were, in the 
words of the Brown Commission test, “clearly sufficient to produce the 
result.”228  These “lost-chance” cases, then, like the drunk-driving 
homicide cases, suggest the emergence, unbidden, of intuitions about 
causal overdetermination. 
This comparison of the drunk-driving homicide cases and the lost-
chance cases might appear, at first glance, to founder on the critical 
distinction between conduct-based causation and aspect-based causation.  
In the lost-chance cases, after all, the courts’ lost-chance reasoning is 
brought to bear on the basic threshold question whether the defendant’s 
conduct was a but-for cause of the victim’s injury.  In the drunk-driving 
homicide cases, by contrast, the courts’ lost-chance-type reasoning is 
brought to bear on the additional, and very different, question whether the 
wrongful aspect of the defendant’s conduct was a cause of the victim’s 
injury.  Given that wrongful-aspect causation plays a different role in the 
law than does wrongful-conduct causation,229 must not we assume that any 
analogy between the lost-chance cases and the drunk-driving cases is 
misguided? 
The answer to this question is no.  Though aspect- and conduct-based 
causal rules play different roles in the law, they nevertheless are grounded 
in the same basic intuitions.  This intuitive connection can best be 
illustrated by a comparison of two closely-related hypothetical scenarios.230  
In both scenarios, a doctor is prosecuted for administering a fatal overdose 
of a prescription drug to a patient.  Specifically, the doctor administers to 
the patient a dose of medication that is twice the amount approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration.  Everyone agrees that the administration of 
the approved dose would not have been negligent, but that the 
administration of the double-dose was negligent.  Where the expert 
witnesses disagree is on whether the patient’s death was (1) attributable to 
the overdose or (2) attributable to an adverse reaction that would have 
occurred even if the patient had received only the approved dose. 
For the first variation of this scenario, suppose the doctor administers 
the double-dose in two separate doses that are fifteen minutes apart.  At 
2:00 p.m., she administers the first dose.  At 2:15 p.m., she administers a 
second dose.  The patient dies the next day.  In this scenario, the dispute 
over causation would center on the basic threshold question whether the 
                                                                                                                          
228 NAT’L COMM’N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 23, at 31. 
229 See supra text accompanying notes 80–87. 
230 These hypothetical cases are based on Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 383–85 (2d 
Cir. 1998), where a patient’s surviving spouse sought damages from a physician who had administered 
a 1600 milligram overdose of Danocrine to the patient. 
 2013] WRONGFUL-ASPECT OVERDETERMINATION 643 
doctor’s negligent conduct was a cause of the victim’s death.  After all, the 
doctor’s administration of the second dose was a separate act, and the 
plaintiff’s negligence claim necessarily is based exclusively on this 
separate act; the doctor’s administration of the first dose was not wrongful. 
For the second variation of this scenario, suppose instead that the 
doctor administers the double-dose all at once at 2:00 p.m.  Again, the 
patient dies the next day.  In this scenario, the threshold question of but-for 
causation would not be in dispute: the doctor’s single act of administering 
the double dose plainly was a but-for cause of the victim’s death.  The 
dispute over causation would center instead on the separate question 
whether the patient’s death was attributable to the risks that made the 
doctor’s conduct wrongful.  It would center on the question whether the 
patient’s death was attributable to the increment by which the dose 
exceeded the approved dose.231  In other words, the dispute would center 
on the scope-of-the-risk question. 
Our intuition, I think, is that the doctor’s liability ought to depend in 
both cases on the causal connection, if any, between the patient’s death and 
the increment by which the dose administered to the patient exceeded the 
approved dose.  It should not matter whether the overdose was 
administered in a single act or in two acts separated by fifteen minutes.  
This intuition becomes stronger, moreover, as we reduce the time 
separating the two doses—to fifteen seconds, say, rather than fifteen 
minutes.  In a case like this, the scope-of-the-risk limitation and its 
wrongful-aspect variant seem merely to be natural extensions of our efforts 
to define as precisely as possible the specific act that provides the basis for 
the defendant’s prosecution.232  At bottom, the scope-of-the-risk rule and 
its wrongful-aspect variant appear to be grounded in the same basic 
intuition as the traditional threshold requirement of but-for causation. 
There is little reason, then, to ascribe to mere coincidence the emergent 
symmetry between (1) cases where the wrongful aspect of the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                          
231 See id. at 389–90 (addressing sequentially (1) the question of whether the doctor’s 
administration of a 1600 milligram dose of Danocrine was a but-for cause of Mrs. Zuchowicz’s death, 
and (2) the question of whether the overdose (the increment by which the dose exceeded the 800 
milligram dose recommended by the FDA) was a but-for cause of Mrs. Zuchowicz’s death). 
232 See Gerard Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Pts. III and IV, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
920, 933 (1987) (explaining that in criminal law the required act must be “conceived as taking place in 
an instant of time so precise that it can be associated with a particular mental state of intention, 
awareness of risk, or neglect of due care”); Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved 
Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719, 727 (1992) 
(“American criminal law generally restricts its view of choice to the actor’s immediate decision to do 
wrong.”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to 
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 972 (2004) (“At common law, 
crime was conceived as occurring at a discrete moment, and this template endures.”); see also Hales v. 
Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. 387, 397 (C.B. 1562); 1 Plow. 253, 259 (“[T]he doing of the Act is the only Point 
which the Law regards . . . .”).   
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conduct contributes to the causal mechanism responsible for another 
person’s death; and (2) cases where the defendant’s wrongful conduct 
contributes to the causal mechanism that is responsible for another 
person’s death.  This symmetry instead appears to speak to the existence of 
an intuitive recognition that an actor’s conduct or its wrongful aspect 
counts as a cause if it makes a potentially decisive contribution to a causal 
mechanism that, in the aggregate, is responsible for the result. 
X.  CONCLUSION 
It would be easy to get the impression that—in the words of 
philosopher Jonathan Schaffer—“overdetermination is everywhere.”233  
But most criminal cases are not causal overdetermination cases.  In most 
criminal cases, as in most tort cases, the defendant’s conduct either “would 
have been . . . necessary for the occurrence, . . . or would not have been 
involved in that occurrence in any way at all.”234  Suppose, for example, 
that the defendant is one of two archers who carelessly (and independently) 
fire in the victim’s direction, and that the victim dies after being struck by 
a single arrow.  In this case, the defendant’s conduct either will have 
“made a positive and necessary contribution to the occurrence of the 
injury” or will “have been completely uninvolved.”235  Because most 
criminal cases are “either/or” cases, rather than causal-overdetermination 
cases, the courts usually are justified in applying the traditional but-for test 
without modification.236 
Still, criminal law scholars are wrong in supposing that causal-
overdetermination cases are “extraordinary”237 or “extremely rare.”238  For 
starters, the logic of causal overdetermination informs the courts’ decisions 
in the lost-chance homicide cases, whether the courts realize it or not.  In 
these cases, which are utterly commonplace,239 the courts have imposed 
liability for homicide after concluding only that the defendant’s conduct 
deprived the victim of a “chance” of surviving another illness or injury.240  
Proof that the defendant’s conduct deprived the victim of a “chance” of 
                                                                                                                          
233 Jonathan Schaffer, Overdetermining Causes, 114 PHIL. STUD. 23, 26 (2003). 
234 Stapleton, supra note 175, at 40; see also HART & HONORÉ, supra note 29, at 113 (“In 
ordinary cases, where only one sufficient cause is present, a causally relevant factor will also be a 
condition sine qua non . . . . It is this fact that accounts for the prominence in law of the negative sine 
qua non test.”). 
235 Stapleton, supra note 175, at 40. 
236 Id. at 46. 
237 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 2 (1985). 
238 Larry Alexander, Michael Moore and the Mysteries of Causation in the Law, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 
301, 311 (2011). 
239 See Johnson, supra note 185, at 61 n.3 (citing cases which apply lost-chance reasoning in place 
of but-for causation). 
240 Id. at 76. 
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survival is not proof of but-for causation, of course.  Rather, it is proof of 
causal overdetermination; it is proof that the defendant contributed 
incrementally to the causal mechanism underlying the victim’s death and 
that the defendant’s contribution was potentially decisive.241 
Drunk-driving homicide cases, too, are causal-overdetermination 
cases.  What makes the drunk-driving homicide cases interesting and 
distinctive is that the logic of causal overdetermination is brought to bear 
not in resolving the threshold question whether the defendant’s conduct 
caused the harm but in resolving the separate and additional question 
whether the wrongful aspect of the defendant’s conduct caused the harm.  
In drunk-driving homicide cases, the wrongful aspect of the defendant’s 
conduct—his intoxication—nearly always will contribute incrementally to 
the causal mechanism behind the accident.  Again, most traffic accidents 
result from the interplay of roadway hazards with limitations on the 
driver’s ability to perceive and react.  Intoxication contributes to this 
mechanism by diminishing the driver’s abilities. 
This, in any event, is the most plausible explanation for what the courts 
have been doing in the drunk-driving homicide cases.  Both in states where 
the courts purport to have adopted the scope-of-the-risk requirement and in 
states where the courts purport to have rejected this requirement, the courts 
appear to have recognized intuitively that liability for drunk-driving 
homicide is appropriate only where the scope-of-the-risk requirement is 
satisfied.  At the same time, however, courts on both sides of this seeming 
divide appear to have recognized that the required connection between the 
conduct’s wrongful aspect and the result need not be a but-for connection.  
The courts’ intuitions in these cases, like their intuitions in the lost-chance 
cases, point toward causal overdetermination.  What remains is only for the 
courts to make explicit the logic at work in these cases. 
                                                                                                                          
241 See id. at 76–86 (describing cases where the “victim would have had a ‘chance’ of surviving 
but for the defendant’s culpable acts or omissions”). 
